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PREFACE 
Born into a wealthy merchant family in London, 
John Ruskin (1819-1900) had open to him all the educational 
and career opportunities of his class. Yet, he acquired 
no more than an A.B. at Oxford, and he did not pursue a 
career in the family wine business, in the government, or 
in the professions. Instead, he spent his life between 
living in London and traveling on the Continent, the whole 
scrutinizing first art, then society, continually writing 
about what he saw. He arrived at his conclusions without 
reference to outside authority. This independent thought 
resulted in such statements as those in which he regarded 
Rembrandt and Raphael as inferior artists and John Stuart 
Mill, Adam Smith, and Jeremy Bentham as faulty economists. 
Such pronouncements alienated him from many of his own 
class, not only because he uttered heresy, but also be­
cause he presumed authority in two seemingly disparate 
fields. Yet, he was in wide demand as a lecturer on art, 
and his being the first Slade Professor of Art at Oxford 
• • * Xll 
was a high point in his career. The fact is, that although 
Ruskin's teachings are individualistic, they conform so 
well to fundamental truths, and here he appealed to many 
people of all classes. One of these fundamental truths 
is that truly great art comes only from a society equal 
to producing it. 
The purpose of this study is to show how Ruskin 
thought great art could be generated in a society. He 
sees this generation possible only in the hearts of all 
members of a society. First, he defines what great art 
is by locating its excellence in the heart of the indivi­
dual artist rather than in external considerations of 
technique or convention. Second, he seeks to produce 
\ 
conditions for a great society, the kind of society out 
of which great artists can come. He defines greatness 
in a society in the same terms that he defines greatness 
in art, that is, society must try to produce happy people 
rather than make more money. Third, he shows how once 
general welfare is achieved, then individuals of artistic 
ability will immortalize that society in their art, thus 
welding artist and society together. In short, the artist, 
rather than be repelled by what he sees around him, 
iv 
embodies the ideals of his people. The union between art 
and society, if it is to occur at all, must occur within 
the individual. 
V 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the years 1856-1860 span only a short time 
in terms of Ruskin's long life and prolific work, they are 
significant because during this time Ruskin not only for­
mulates the characteristics of noble or great art, but he 
also sets forth the corresponding characteristics that are 
necessary in a society to produce such art. For a true 
union between art and society to exist, not only must a 
nation provide for art, but art must, in turn, have ref­
erence to the nation producing it. The fusion of the two 
can only occur, however, when both put away theoretical 
preoccupations that are not founded upon man's experience. 
Only when they are guided by the truth of experience will 
they become vital and enriching influences in men's lives. 
Society then must provide for material well-being, and 
art for spiritual and aesthetic well-being. Both then 
will serve mankind totally, and life will become ennobled. 
That the year 1856 is a significant starting point 
is indicated by Francis G. Townsend when he says that in 
1 
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1871 Ruskin prepared some of his works for republication. 
In the preface of Sesame and Lilies in this edition, Ruskin 
tells how his early works were hampered by religious fervor 
and a desire to show off his writing ability. Except for 
his pronouncements on "art, policy, or morality, as distinct 
from religion," he therefore decided to "reprint scarcely 
anything in this series out of the first and second volumes 
of Modern Painters" and to "omit much of the Seven Lamps 
and Stones of Venice." However, he would reprint all of 
his books written in the previous fifteen years "without 
change." Townsend concludes by pointing out that in Ruskin's 
own judgment., his earlier works were youthful experiments: 
"His real work began in 1856, the year of Modern Painters 
III and IV. 
Following those two volumes were: The Political 
Economy of Art (1857), later titled A Joy Forever, The Two 
Paths (1859), Modern Painters V (1860), and Unto This Last 
(1860). Together with Modern Painters III and IV, these 
works comprise the canon of this study. 
^Ruskin and the Landscape Feeling: a Critical 
Analysis of His Thought during the Crucial Years of His 
Life, 1843-1856 (Urbana, Illinois, 1951), p. 80. 
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In the first ten chapters of Modern Painters III 
and the first five chapters of Modern Painters IV, Ruskin 
clears up ambiguities and apparent contradictions for which 
Modern Painters I and II had been criticized in connection 
with his views on art and Turner's achievement.^ Ruskin 
had been accused of contradicting himself in Modern Painters 
II when he said that Turner was superior both in showing 
details and in being visionary.^ In Modern Painters III 
Ruskin defines his central position of what he means when 
he says Turner is superior in an apparently contradictory 
sense: 
That art is the greatest which expresses the greatest 
number of the noblest ideas. Art is the expression 
of an artist's soul. A man may have soul and not be 
able to paint, in which case he ought not to be a 
painter. But, be his manipulation never so perfect, 
he is not a great artist unless he is also capable 
of receiving and imparting noble impressions. 
The last eight chapters of Modern Painters III and 
the last two chapters of Modern Painters IV ("The Mountain 
Gloom" and "The Mountain Glory") are a treatise on the 
^The Life of John Ruskin, 2nd ed. 2 vols. 
(London, 1912), I, 343. 
^Ibid., 338-39. 
^Ibid., 339-40. 
4 
history of man's attitudes toward natural scenery.^ In 
these chapters Ruskin traces the gradual disappearance of 
man's faith in God by comparing Greek, medieval, and modern 
concepts of God in natural elements. This loss of man's 
faith figures strongly in Ruskin's view of error in modern 
art and society. 
The last two parts of Modern Painters V, "of Inven­
tion Formal" and "of Invention Spiritual," are, as Edward 
T. Cook says, "a treatise on 'the relations of Art to God 
and man.'"^ In the chapters on "Invention Spiritual," 
Ruskin begins to define the interrelationship between art, 
God, and man. Here he departs from theoretical concerns 
to a practical concern for the future of nations like 
England which ignore the legitimate place of art and reli­
gious devotion in national life. As he closes this five-
volume effort, spanning seventeen years of intense thought 
and observation, his concern for humanity, the apparent 
digressive element in the work, is set forth as his real 
concern. In "The Dark Mirror" he says that Modern Painters 
^Ibid., 343-44. 
^Ibid., 337. 
^Ibid. 
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has brought "everything to a root in human passion or human 
hope." They were designed to defend Turner, but 
they have been colored throughout,--nay, continually 
altered in shape, and even warped and laroken, by di­
gressions respecting social questions, which had for 
me an interest tenfold greater than the work I had 
been forced into undertaking.8 
Indeed, had his father not prodded him, Ruskin may never 
have completed Modern Painters. As he worked on this last 
volume, economic and political ideas vied with his attempt 
to close this work on art. Art is still the ostensible 
topic, but, according to Cook, "the inquiry leads him to 
consider the right economy of labour."^ 
This overt concern for humanity is perhaps the 
greatest distinguishing feature of Modern Painters, III, 
IV, and V as compared to Modern Painters I and II. John 
D. Rosenberg says that in the ten years between the second 
and third volumes Ruskin "became less moved by the beauty 
of art arid nature than by the waste, mystery, and terror 
8 The Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook and 
Alexander Wedderburn, Library Edition, 39 vols. (London, 
1903-1912), VII, 257. Reference to this edition will be 
by volume and page number, and will be included in the text. 
%ook, I, 529-30. 
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of life."^® His deepening sense of the tragic condition 
of man is exemplified in the chapter, "The Mountain Gloom," 
in Modern Painters IV.The mountain peasantry barely 
eke out a living from the rocky mountain, slopes. They 
share none of the religious inspiration that the grandeur 
of the mountain peaks seems to suggest. Cook says that 
more and more Ruskin was disturbed by the apparent indif­
ference of men toward trying to make their lives noble and 
good: 
The responsibilities of human life, the shortness of 
the allotted span, as measured by the infinity of 
things to be learnt and to be done, weighed heavily 
upon a man whose curiosity was . . . unbounded. . . .^^ 
Both "The Mountain Gloom" and "The Mountain Glory" had a 
practical purpose. By marking this contrast between moun­
tain glory and human misery, Ruskin hoped to arouse the 
attention of his readers to help the mountain peasantry 
better their condition. 
^^The Darkening Glass: A Portrait of Ruskin's 
Genius (New York, 1961), p. 22. 
^^Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
^^Cook, I, 509. 
l^Ibid., 347. 
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After completing Modern Painters III and IV, Ruskin 
pursued his interest in man's condition more intensely. 
He was in demand throughout England as a lecturer on art. 
But, he was more concerned about the conditions necessary 
in society for great art to be produced and honored. In 
July, 1857, he delivered two lectures on art and society 
at Manchester, England. Later published as A Joy Forever, 
these lectures outlined the responsibility of the people 
in nurturing and preserving great art. From 1858 to 1859 
he delivered five more lectures in various towns. These 
lectures, on how the characteristics of a nation are re­
flected in that nation's art, were published as The Two 
Paths. These two works connect Ruskin's theories of art 
with economic and practical life.Through these lectures, 
he was able to take his views to the masses of people, 
those who were more doers than thinkers. He did not want 
to write merely for a passive audience. Cook says, "he 
wanted to see, in the everyday world, some fruit of his 
principles and labours.The reason A Joy Forever became 
^^Derrick Leon, Ruskin: The Great Victorian 
(London, 1949), p. 266. 
^^Cook, I, 430. 
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the title of the Manchester lectures was that it summarized 
all of Ruskin's teaching as far as he was concerned: "If 
only the English nation could be made to understand that 
the beauty which is indeed to be a joy forever, must be 
a joy for all."^^ 
The year 1860 is significant as a terminating point 
in a study of Ruskin's works, because with the publication 
of Unto This Last he began the social and economic criti­
cism that was to occupy his chief thought the rest of his 
life. The book ranked high in his estimation. In 1877 
he called Unto This Last "the central work of my life; . . . 
it contained at once the substance of all that I have had 
since to say."^^ He not only considered its message im­
portant, but he also rated its simple style above the or-
nateness of Modern Painters.The superiority of the 
book's style is also noted by Frederic Harrison, who says 
it contains 
all that is noble in Ruskin's written prose, with 
hardly any, or very few, of his excesses and mannerisms. 
^^Ibid., 431. 
^^Ibid., II, 2. 
l^ibid. 
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. . . The book as a whole is a masterpiece of pure, 
incisive, imaginative, lucid English. 
In Unto This Last Ruskin attacks the purely theoret­
ical science of political economy which ignores the broad 
concerns for humanity in its justification of the processes 
of industrialism. The force of his argument, carried for­
ward in a spirit of ironic humor and mixed with a tone of 
righteous indignation, is that by ignoring love and justice, 
the things that truly motivate people, political economy 
is not a science at all. Its theories are not based upon 
society in its totality. It considers only how men become 
rich and ignores the equally important fact that men also 
become poor. In a nation pursuing such a dichotomous 
course, Ruskin sees no sense of the kind of national life 
and ideals conducive to the production of either great 
art or noble living. 
Ruskin's qualifications as an economist or social 
critic were discounted by many people who could not con­
ceive an art critic writing about economics. However, 
E. T. Cook says that Ruskin*s mind was analytical regard­
less of whether artistic or economic principles were under 
^^Tennyson, Ruskin, Mill, and Other Literary Esti­
mates (New York, 1902), p. 69. 
10 
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consideration. His grasp of language and respect for words 
served liim well in attacking the "masked words" of the 
economists. Further, Ruskin grew up in a merchant's house, 
and was aware of his father's dealings in the wine business. 
Cook says other qualifications such as "his first-hand 
knowledge of arts and crafts gave him a real insight into 
the finer qualities of work, and a considerable advantage 
over many of the arm-chair economists." His extensive 
travels in western and southern Europe also gave him in­
sights into agricultural and national life.^® 
Ruskin's concern for the working classes was not 
a sudden thing in 1860. When he was young, he heard his 
father's Spanish partner in their wine business speak de-
precatingly about the Spanish and French peasants who worked 
in their vineyards. Young Ruskin, however, knew that these 
lowly people produced the wine that not only brought satis­
faction to the upper classes, but also supported his own 
family. In 1847 as he toured Scotland, he noted in his 
diary how cheerful fishermen were, despite their hard 
lives.Between 1848 and 1858, as he toured the Continent, 
20cook, II, 12. 
2lFrederick W. Roe, The Social Philosophy of 
Carlvle and Ruskin CNew York. 1921). DO. 136-37. 
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he saw luxury and misery developing side by side. In 
France in 1848 he saw masses of lower-class people on the 
verge of violence in Paris and Rouen. These things greatly 
upset him, for he not only felt guilty about his own well-
being, but he noticed the contrast between God's work in 
the beauty of nature and the apparent absence of it in 
human nature. 
By 1852 he was ready to publicly express his views 
on politics, and he drafted three letters to the Times. 
However, his father, fearing for his son's reputation, 
succeeded in suppressing the letters, and Ruskin shelved 
them. Yet, some of his views came through in the chapter, 
"The Nature of Gothic" in The Stones of Venice, which he 
was writing at this time.^^ 
The years 1856-1860 saw more than a maturing of 
Ruskin*s artistic thought in Modern Painters III and IV 
and a maturing of his social thought in Unto This Last. 
Most important is the maturing of his concept of the inter­
relationship of these major facets of man's being. For 
art to be great, it must have reference to the society 
^^ibid., p. 138. 
^^cook, I, 277. 
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producing it. Where before he spoke about the necessity 
of art to refer to nature to be great, he now shifts this 
reference to man and society. Yet, the quality of life 
in a nation must be such that its artists, in a spirit 
of devotion or worship, seek to immortalize national life 
in their art. 
However, the energy of nineteenth-century, indus­
trial England was being spent in widening the gulf between 
rich and poor. With materialism and technology as the 
sole considerations in most industrial and political lead­
ers' minds, the necessary human and spiritual grounds for 
great art were not included in national goals. As long 
as this condition lasted, neither material welfare for 
the poorer masses of men nor spiritual and aesthetic health 
for all Englishmen was possible. The qualities of mind 
that Ruskin set forth as necessary for great art became 
the same qualities necessary for the ennobling of society. 
This is the direction Ruskin's thought took in the years 
1856-1860. 
CHAPTER II 
GREATNESS IN ART 
As Ruskin opens Modern Painters III, he determines 
to define what makes art great: 
1 have said that the art is greatest which includes 
the greatest ideas; but I have not endeavoured to de­
fine the nature of this greatness in the ideas them­
selves. We speak of great truths, of great beauties, 
great thoughts. What is it which makes one truth greater 
than another, one thought greater than another?^ 
His first concern is to show the error that occurs 
when the atterr^t is made to define great art in a purely 
technical sense. He notes the "supposed distinction" be­
tween the "Great and Low Schools" of art. The former school 
is purported to be "descriptive of a certain noble manner 
of painting" that is to be revered by art students. The 
latter school is characterized as "vulgar," "low," or 
"realist^" and art students are taught to avoid it (V, 19). 
Ruskin questions this "highness" in art: 
^he Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook and Alex­
ander Wedderburn, Library Edition, 39 vols. (London, 1903-
1912), \r, 19. Reference to this edition will be by volume 
and page number^ and will be included in the text. 
13 
14 
Has it been, or is it, a true highness, a true prince-
liness, or only a show of it, consisting in courtly 
manners and robes of state? (V, 19) 
To answer this question, Ruskin draws upon the art 
theories of Sir Joshua Reynolds in The Idler. In his 
essays Reynolds tries to distinguish between the "Great" 
and "Low" schools of art along purely technical lines. He 
says that the Italian painters belong to the "Great" school 
because they excel in a style which corresponds to that of 
imaginative poetry. He relegates the Dutch painters to the 
"Low" school because they excel in a mechanical imitation 
of their subject matter "in which the slowest intellect 
is always sure to succeed best" (V, 21-22). Reynolds bases 
his distinction upon the kind of details the painters use. 
Because Dutch painting "attends to literal truth and minute 
exactness in the details of nature modified by accident," 
it uses "variable" details, corresponding to those which 
historical writing uses. On the other hand, the Italians 
use "invariable" details as they treat of spiritual and 
eternal subjects. Reynolds concludes: "Works which attend 
only to the invariable are full of genius and soul" (V, 24). 
To show the error of Reynolds' reasoning, Ruskin 
applies his criteria to poetic writing, an example of "High" 
15 
art, and examines the kinds of details which appear in such 
writing. Does poetic art use only invariable details? Does 
the appearance of variable details render a work unpoetic 
as Reynolds states? Ruskin answers both of these questions 
in the negative, and he shows the invalidity of Reynolds* 
distinction by examining some lines from Byron's "The Pri­
soner of Chillon." Ruskin finds that Byron draws heavily 
upon variable details in writing his poem. Ruskin cites 
these lines: 
A thousand feet in depth below 
The massy waters meet and flow; 
So far the fathom line was sent 
From Chillon's snow-white battlement. 
A purely historical rendering of these lines appears as 
follows: "The lake was sounded from the walls of the Castle 
of Chillon, and found to be a thousand feet deep." If 
Reynolds is right, Byron will have left out unnecessary, 
"variable," details and included only the invariable, for 
example, "the points which the Lake of Geneva and Castle 
of Chillon have in common with all other lakes and castles" 
(V, 25-26). 
Yet, such words as "below," "massy," "meet and 
flow," "fathom line," and "snow-white" are details not 
absolutely necessary to describe Chillon: 
16 
This is a curious result. Instead of finding, as we 
expected, the poetry distinguished from the history 
by the omission of details, we find it consist entirely 
in the addition of details; and instead of being 
characterized by regard only of the invariable, we 
find its whole power to consist in the clear expres­
sion of what is singular and particular! (V, 25-27) 
Although it would appear that Reynolds had reversed his 
terms, and that poetry should be defined as having variable 
and history invariable details, Ruskin warns that this would 
be an erroneous conclusion, too. 
Reynolds and those who try to classify art according 
to intellectual or technical questions are on the wrong 
track. It is not the addition or subtraction of certain 
kinds of details that determines historical or poetical 
utterance, but rather: 
There is something either in the nature of the details 
themselves, or the method of using them, which invests 
them with poetical or historical propriety. (V, 27-28) 
As in poetry, so in painting: 
. . .  w e  s h a l l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  f i n d  p r e s e n t l y  t h a t  a  
painting is to be classed in the great or inferior 
schools, not according to the kind of details which 
it represents, but according to the uses for which 
it en^loys them. (V, 30-31) 
Ruskin shifts attention as to the components of great art 
from the purely technical aspects, the tools, to the intent 
of the artist or writer. The truth which Reynolds glossed 
17 
over was that the greatness of a painting lies not in the 
technique, that is, in the materials, or subject, or method 
of treatment, but rather "in the nobleness of the end to 
which the effort of the painter is addressed" (V, 42). 
This nobility is determined by how much of the 
artist's soul becomes involved in his art. Evidence of 
this involvement of soul appears in four ways. First, it 
appears in his love for his subject matter. This love in­
volves the suppression of his ego in deference to his sub­
ject matter, or content. Allied to this love for subject 
matter is the quality of seeing nature clearly. The task 
does not lie in "simple" imitation, for to capture nature 
as she is, is highly challenging. Third, the artist must 
love beauty consistent with natural fact. The ugly must 
be taken with the beautiful for true beauty to exist in 
art. Last, and most important, the artist must possess 
invention, the imaginative quality which either presents 
visions in the artist's mind or participates in the arrange­
ment of observed or remembered fact. All these elements 
must appear, in varying degrees, in a work of art for it 
to be great (V, 65-66). Matters of technique, formula, 
theory, or convention simply get in the way, and prevent 
18 
the artist's communication of experience, or nature, to 
the viewer. 
I. LOVE OF SUBJECT MATTER 
Great artists choose noble subjects, which involve 
"wide interests and profound passions, as opposed to those 
which involve narrow interests and slight passions." The 
habitual choice of such sacred subjects as the Nativity, 
Transfiguration, or Crucifixtion shows a natural tendency 
to depict highest human thoughts. Leonardo's "The Last 
Supper" is an example. On the next lower level would be 
Raphael's "School of Athens," which depicts great men. 
The third order includes "passions and events of ordinary 
life." There are degrees in this last order, too. Paint­
ings, such as Hunt's "Claudio and Isabella," which show 
deep thoughts and sorrows are higher than those which treat 
of brutalities and vices for no instructive purpose 
(V, 48-49). 
If Ruskin were merely content to impose his own 
standards of ranking art, then he could be accused of com­
mitting a worse error than Reynolds did. Reynolds at least 
proceeded on logical grounds. But Ruskin does not stop 
19 
at merely a moral ranking of subject matter as an index of 
nobility. He is quick to refer again to the devotional 
state of mind of the artist toward his subject. This is 
the factor which Reynolds had over-looked. The choice of 
subject,, Ruskin says, must be "sincere." That is, it must 
be "made from the heart." When this qualification enters, 
the order of nobility can become reversed. Painters of 
peasant's brawls and childrens' games raise the nobleness 
of their subjects when they paint them sincerely. Noble 
subjects are frequently chosen insincerely. The reason 
for this is that such choices are made out of ambition and 
vanity. Such an artist 
mistakes his vanity for inspiration, his ambition for 
greatness of soul, and takes pleasure in what he calls 
"the ideal," merely because he has neither humility 
nor capacity enough to comprehend the real. (V, 49-50) 
Although great artists are aware of the excellence 
of their work in comparison to that of other artists, and 
the world in general, nevertheless they are humble. They 
simply accept this separation between the high quality 
of their own labor and the low quality of the labor of 
others as a matter of fact (V, 331). The reason for this 
quiet acceptance is that there is a basic unity between 
their genuine nature and their work. They produce what 
20 
they are. In this respect Ruskin values Scott and Turner 
somewhat more than Wordsworth, whom he considers "often 
affected in his simplicity" (V, 332). This truth to self 
helps the young artist find his way through all the various 
theories and teachings about creating art. He may gain 
quick attention by following popular fads or theories, 
but if he paints true to himself, he will be painting better 
pictures, even if he is not popular (XVI^ 295). 
The reason such an artist will paint better pic­
tures is that he will become less self-conscious. He will 
be able to concentrate more on his subject. When this 
happens, he becomes more closely linked to the truth of 
his world. Ruskin says that a great artist never can be 
egotistic: 
The whole of his power depends upon his losing sight 
and feeling of his own existence, and becoming a mere 
witness and mirror of truth. . . . (V, 125) 
There is no room for the "I" in great art, and it is the 
willingness, indeed, the innately felt necessity of re­
moving or suppressing the "l" which Ruskin refers to when 
he speaks of the morality of the artist. He denies that 
he says only a good man can produce great art. What he 
does say is that an artist needs the one quality of 
perceiving the goodness of nature, a quality that requires 
"certain moral conditions." The artist may be "warped" 
in his personal life, and he may be talented, nevertheless. 
But, the one element he needs to produce great art is a 
true perception of nature, or his subject, whether this 
makes him a good man or not (XVI, 310). Charles Dougherty 
states why this requirement is so necessary to achieve 
greatness. He says that according to Ruskin, our moral 
nature is not a perceiving thing in itself. It operates 
through love, or "the capacity to lose sight of one's 
self. . . . The passions of love energize and sharpen the 
intellect and the sensibilities." If an artist does not 
love his subject, he "will not be able to know it because 
his senses and intellect will lack the extra dimension of 
passionate intensity that is added by love." 
This love, or attitude of devotion, toward the 
subject achieves the synthesis between fact and art that 
Ruskin deems essential. In Modern Painters II he details 
how this synthesis is achieved when he describes the 
^"Ruskin's Moral Argument," Victorian Newsletter, 
No. 9 (1957), p. 6. 
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penetrative imagination. It pierces external appearance 
and "plunges into the very central fiery heart" of things. 
"Its function and gift are the getting at the root, its 
nature and dignity depend on its holding things always 
by the heart." Ruskin calls this faculty "the highest 
intellectual power of man" (IV, 250-51). But, Ruskin warns 
that we must not confuse sensibility with sensitive pene­
tration. He is not talking about mere sentiment which plays 
on the surfaces of things: "Sensitive feeling reaches be­
low sentiment with the more real power of penetrating to 
the truth.For the penetrative imagination, as an "in­
tellectual" power, to be operative, the artist needs the 
prior condition of love toward his subject and the complete 
abnegation of himself in deference to conveying the message 
that subject seems to offer. 
Ruskin seems to attribute the artistic excellence 
of Shakespeare and Turner to their power of penetrative 
imagination. Inherent in his consideration of these artists 
is his admiration for their negation of self. Shakespeare 
^Bernard Bosanquet, A History of Aesthetic, 2nd 
ed. (London, 1966), p. 458. 
^enry Ladd, The Victorian Morality of Art: An 
Analysis of Ruskin's Aesthetic (New York, 1932), p. 212. 
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succeeds in depicting the germ of human nature in his 
characters. He 
sympathizes so completely with all creatures as to 
deprive himself, together with his personal identity, 
even of his conscience, as he casts himself into their 
hearts. (VI, 440) 
Shakespeare succeeds because by negating himself, he can 
become several different persons. He is capable of a mul­
tiple personality that he could not have, if, instead of 
seizing the essence of his characters first, he became 
preoccupied with problems of technique. 
Ruskin attributes Turner's superior power to his 
ability to subordinate himself to his subject and allow 
his penetrative imagination to reveal truths which are 
hidden to pure formalists. After he details the Turnerian 
mind in terms of its imaginative qualities in producing 
"Turnerian topography," Ruskin concludes that the imagina­
tion, rather than a faculty suspect, is to be the most 
trusted: 
In its work, the vanity and individualism of the man 
himself are crushed, and he becomes a mere instrument 
or mirror, used by a higher power for the reflection 
to others of a truth which no effort of his could ever 
have ascertained. (VI, 44) 
According to Waldo H. Dunn, Turner was an estab­
lished and wealthy artist when Ruskin wrote the first 
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volume of Modern Painters, the purpose of which was a de­
fense of Turner against what Ruskin considered unjust crit­
icism. Raskin was defending Turner's later "impression­
istic" manner of painting against critics who judged only 
by fidelity to convention. Dunn goes on to say that Rus­
kin* s attitude toward Turner's later impressionistic paint­
ings was a modern one, that is, he searched for the intent 
of the artist, the source from which the artist received 
his impressions. In examining such sources, Dunn says, 
Ruskin's: approach was scientific, not sentimental.^ Solo-
man Fishman concurs with Dunn's estimation of Ruskin's 
criticism. He says that Ruskin's description of the pene­
trative imagination brought him close to enunciating the 
modern definition of Expressionism. In defining this 
quality of the imagination, Ruskin revolutionized art 
theory by repudiating neo-classical idealization of nature 
and focused on the artist's ability to get to inner truth 
as a basis for a picture's reason for being.^ Ruskin was 
calling for a genuine communication between the artist 
^"Ruskin and the Values of Life," Lectures on Three 
Eminent Victorians (Claremont, Calif., 1932), p. 41. 
%he Interpretation of Art (Berkeley, Calif., 1963), 
pp. 29-31. 
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and men, accomplished only by a realistic discernment of 
fact of experience so that convention and formula could 
not get in the way.^ 
This need for communication of experience by the 
artist to men made the intent, the "nobility of the end," 
of the artist so important to Ruskin. The love of the 
artist for the particular experience he wishes to convey 
insures that the communication will be a moral one. Ruskin 
requires that the spectator of a work of art needs a moral 
sense capable of grasping the artist's communication of 
a vital truth which the artist, in his turn, has, through 
his penetrative imagination, discerned in nature, or 
experience. In this way the spectator, discerning the 
truth the artist has conveyed, knows the work is moral, 
Q 
and so he can love what the artist has produced. In short, 
the viewer can love art, the end to which Ruskin's efforts 
are directed. 
Although love and devotion toward the subject must 
be primary in the artist's mind, nevertheless technical 
^Jerome H. Buckley, "The Moral Aesthetic," The 
Victorian Temper (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 155-56. 
Sibid., p. 153. 
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excellence determines whether one truly can call himself 
an artist in the first place. One who cannot "both colour 
and draw beautifully . . . has no business to consider him­
self a painter at all ..." (V, 52). 
Not only must there be technical excellence, but 
even love for the subject does not mean great art will be 
produced. The artist must be honest with himself in deter­
mining whether or not he has penetrative imagination. He 
must honestly assess his imaginative powers so that he 
does not try to paint sacred subjects or great men if he 
cannot enter their minds or imagine great events as they 
really happened. Otherwise, he will degrade 
the subjects he intended to honour, and his work is 
more utterly thrown away, and his rank as an artist is, 
in reality, lower, than if he had devoted himself to 
the imitation of the simplest objects of natural his­
tory. (V, 50) 
There is nothing ignoble, in Ruskin's eyes, about an artist 
who pursues such a course: 
Pure history and pure topography are most precious 
things; in many cases more useful to the human race 
than high imaginative work; and assuredly ... a large 
majority ... in art should never aim at anything 
higher. It is only vanity, never love, . . . which 
prompts men to desert their allegiance to the simple 
truth, in vain pursuit of the imaginative truth . . . 
evermore sealed to them. (VI, 29) 
A noble imagination cannot be resisted. If an artist 
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doubts he has imagination, or if he can resist it, then 
he should 
. . . never try to be a prophet; go on quietly with 
your hard camp-work, and the spirit will come to you 
in the camp . . . ; but try above all things to be 
quickly perceptive of the noble spirit in others. . . . 
(VI, 29) 
Although love of the subject can quicken the per­
ceptive qualities of the mind and can cause the artist 
to forget himself so that the penetrative imagination 
yields up the essence of the subject, this feeling for 
the subject can also have an opposite effect when, through 
strong feeling, the artist allows these feelings to obscure 
the true nature of the subject matter. Ruskin describes 
this effect when he calls it the "pathetic fallacy." Basi­
cally, it is the true appearance of lifeless things in 
nature on the one hand and "the extraordinary, or false 
appearances, when we are under the influence of emotion . 
. ." (V, 204). 
The pathetic fallacy is a quality of modern artists, 
especially writers. The artist expresses 
something which he, as a living creature, imagines 
in the lifeless object, while the classical and 
medieval artists were content with expressing the 
unimaginary and actual qualities of the object it­
self. (V, 221) 
The reason the pathetic fallacy occurs is because moderns 
have removed God from nature, and they have theorized that 
natural things are purely physical. Yet, their religious 
instinct, left without a divine reference, nevertheless 
overcomes theory when they personally confront nature, 
which seems alive. We give in to our religious instinct, 
and instead of ascribing this "unaccountable life" to the 
workings of God, we ascribe human feelings to the natural 
elements, and so we commit the pathetic fallacy (V, 231). 
Ruskin compares Keats, who has committed the pathetic 
fallacy, with Homer, who does not. Keats has described 
an incoming wave as breaking with a "wayward indolence." 
"Wajward" and "indolent" are terms which basically des­
cribe human actions, but Keats transposes these terms to 
a sea wave which then seems to have a life or motive power 
of its own: 
But Homer would never have written, never thought of, 
such words. He could not . . . have lost sight of 
the great fact that the wave, ... do what it might, 
was still . . . salt water; and that salt water could 
not be either wayward or indolent. (V, 221-22) 
Instead, the waves are "over-roofed," "fiill-charged," 
"monstrous," "compact-black," "dark-clear," "violet-
colored," "wine-colored," and so on. These epithets 
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describe pure physical nature: 
. . . they are as accurate and intense in truth as 
words can be, but they never show the slightest feel­
ing of anything animated in the ocean. Black or clear, 
monstrous or violet-colored, cold salt water it is 
always, and nothing but that. (V, 220) 
It is not that Homer did not feel as strongly about the 
sea as Keats. Actually, Homer had stronger feelings. But, 
he separates the sense of life in the sea into "a great 
abstract image of a Sea Power: 
He never says the waves rage, or the waves are idle. 
But he says there is somewhat in, and greater than, 
the waves, which rages, and is idle, and that he calls 
a god. (V, 220-21) 
Homer's perception of nature is accurate because his faith 
in divine beings answers his religious instinct. The divine 
and the physical are separated in his mind; he does not 
confuse the two as Keats does. There is a healthy control 
of emotion as to physical nature, strong as that emotion 
is. Instead of imposing his own emotions upon natural 
elements, he attributes their evident sentiency to the 
divine beings he believes in, while at the same time seeing 
the elements as the dead, lifeless, or insentient things 
they are. Homer, then, succeeds in the same suppression 
of ego that Ruskin admires in Shakespeare and Turner. 
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Ruskin goes on to explain what a Greek's idea of 
a god was. Fire, for example, seemed just as ravenous and 
pitiless to him as it does to Keats. The Greek also felt 
that the sea-wave was wayward or idle. But, he reasoned 
that he could light or put out the fire and dry up the 
water or drink it. It is not the fire or the water that 
rages or is wayward. Rather, there is something m these 
elements which cannot be either controlled or destroyed, 
any more than I destroy myself by cutting off my fin­
ger; I was in my finger,--something of me at least 
was; I had a power over it, and felt pain in it, 
though I am still as much myself when it is gone. 
So there may be a power in the water which is not 
water, but to which the water is as a body;--which 
can strike with it, move in it, suffer in it, yet 
not be destroyed in it. This something, this great 
Water Spirit, I must not confuse with the waves, 
which are only its body. They may flow hither and 
thither, increase or diminish. That must be indivis-
ible--imperishable--a god. So of fire also; those 
rays which I can stop, and in the midst of which I 
cast a shadow, cannot be divine, nor greater than I. 
They cannot feel, but there may be something in them 
that feels,--a glorious intelligence, as much nobler 
and more swift tha.n mine, as these rays, which are 
its body, are nobler and swifter than my flesh.. . . 
(V,222-23) 
The Greek also believed that such powers, or intelligences, 
within the elements could assume human form at will so that 
they could communicate with men or do anything else for 
which their "proper body, whether fire, earth, or air, was 
unfitted": 
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And it would have been to place them beneath, instead 
of above, humanity, if, assuming the form of man, they 
could not also have tasted his pleasures. (V, 223) 
As an example of the gods' ability to come out of their 
natural element and assume human form, Ruskin cites the 
passage in the Iliad in which the river Scamander defends 
the Trojans against Achilles. To deal with Achilles, the 
river god assumes a human form, which Achilles nevertheless 
recognizes as that of the river god. Achilles addresses 
it as a river, not as a man, and its voice is that of a 
river, "out of the deep whirlpools." When Achilles refuses 
to obey it, it changes from its human form back into its 
natural, or divine form, and tries to overwhelm him with 
waves: 
Vulcan defends Achilles, and sends fire against the 
river, which suffers in its water-body, till it is 
able to bear no more. At last even the "nerve of the 
river," or "strength of the river" . . . , feels the 
fire, and this "strength of the river" addresses Vulcan 
in supplications for respite. There is in this pre­
cisely the idea of a vital part of the river-body, 
which acted and felt, and which, if the fire reached 
it, was death, just as would be the case if it touched 
a vital part of the human body. (V, 223-24) 
Their gods acted in nature, whereas moderns theorize that 
nature is motivated by physical laws only. The Greeks 
never tried to contradict their instinctive sense that 
God was ever37where. What sympathy or fellowship a Greek 
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had "were always for the spirit ̂  the stream, not for 
the stream ..." (V, 231). He accepted the spirit in 
natural elements as "plain fact," the forces of these 
elements when ruled by such a spirit as plain fact, and 
the deadness of these elements when "without their spirit": 
a rose was good for scent, and a stream for sound and 
coolness; for the rest, one was no more than leaves, 
the other no more than water; he could not make any­
thing else of them; and the divine power, which was 
involved in their existence, having been all distilled 
way by him into an independent Flora or Thetis, the 
poor leaves or waves were left, in mere cold corporeal-
ness, to make the most of their even being discernibly 
red and soft, clear and wet, and unacknowledged in 
any other power whatsoever. (V, 230) 
In defining his faith, the Greek "threw it entirely 
into a human form, and gave his faith to nothing but the 
image of his own humanity. . . . Content with his human 
S3nnpathy, he approached the actual waves" and woods "with 
no sjmipathy at all" (V, 230) . Consequently, the Greek 
believed his landscape subservient to "human comfort, to 
the foot, the taste, or the smell" (V, 230) . The Odessey 
has many references to "pleasant landscape" in which their 
every feature is "quietly subjugated to human service." 
Ruskin points out how Ulysses reveals his identity to his 
father Laertes, "whom he finds at work in his garden, 
'with thick gloves on, to keep his hands from the thorns,'" 
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by reminding him of the vines, pear-trees, and apple trees 
Laertes gave him as a youth (V, 234). There are other 
references to Ulysses* kissing the "corn-giving land" when 
he finds land after being ship-wrecked (V, 238). 
The medieval mind, however, did not see landscape 
as of service to man for essential needs as the Greeks 
did. Peasants did menial work, while the nobility consider­
ed their landscape as a place to play and make love only. 
This change brought about a less solemn, divine aspect 
of the land. Ho offerings to God were made of the land's 
fruits: 
As the idea of a definite spiritual presence in material 
nature was lost, the mysterious sense of unaccountable 
life in the things themselves would be increased, and 
the mind would instantly be laid open to all those 
currents of fallacious, but pensive and pathetic sym­
pathy, which we have seen to be characteristic of modern 
times. (V, 251) 
Yet, although Ruskin considers tfee pathetic fallacy 
as a weakening quality in art, he does aot condemn it. 
With his emphasis upon the Greeks' genuine belief in God, 
compared to the modern lack of faith, Ruskin condemns the 
faithlessness which gives rise to the pathetic fallacy. 
Yet, as a result of strong feeling, the pathetic fallacy 
gives evidence that men still react to their world genuine­
ly. and Ruskin forsives the pathetic fallacy for this 
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reason. What he condemns is the affectation of feeling, 
a false pathetic fallacy, the sort that Pope uses, reveal­
ing his "cool blood.To distinguish no pathetic fallacy, 
false pathetic fallacy, and genuine pathetic fallacy, Ruskin 
compares Homer, Pope, and Keats in their treatment of a 
passage rendered originally by Homer. When Ulysses and 
his companions flee the Circean palace, they unknowingly 
leave behind the body of Elpenor, the youngest follower, 
whom they do not know is dead. After they cross the sea 
to safe land, Ulysses "summons the shades from Tartarus." 
Elpenor's is the first to appear. Startled, Ulysses ad­
dresses the spirit simply, but in a manner of "bitter and 
terrified lightness": "Elpenor? How comest thou under 
the shadowy darkness? Hast thou come faster on foot than 
I in my black ship?" Pope's rendition is: 
Oj say, what angry power Elpenor led 
To glide in shades, and wander with the dead? 
How could thy soul, by realms and seas disjoined, 
Outfly the nimble sail, and leave the lagging 
wind? 
Pope does not utter a pathetic fallacy at all as to the 
nimbleness of the sail and the laziness of the wind. He 
^J. D. Thomas, "Poetic Truth and Pathetic Fallacy," 
Texas Studies in Literature and Language, III (1961), 346-47. 
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utters the wrong passion, agonized curiosity. But, Ulysses 
wants to know the facts of the matter; and the very 
last thing his mind could do at the moment would be 
to pause, or suggest in any wise what was not a fact. 
The delay in the first three lines, and conceit in 
the last, jar upon us instantly, like the most fright­
ful discord in music. (V, 206) 
Keats, however, asks a similar question with "exquisite 
sincerity": 
He wept, and his bright tears 
Went trickling down the golden bow he held. 
Thus, with half-shut, suffused eyes, he stood; 
While from beneath some cumb'rous boughs hard by. 
With solemn step, an awful goddess came. 
And there was purport in her looks for him. 
Which he with eager guess began to read: 
Perplexed the while, melodiously he said, 
'How cam'St thou over the unfooted sea?' 
"Therefore," Ruskin says, "we see that the spirit of truth 
must guide us in some sort, even in our enjoyment of fal­
lacy." (V, 207) 
Pope, Keats, and Homer illustrate the three orders 
of poets, according to Ruskin. The lowest, exemplified 
by Pope, are those who see truly but feel nothing. They 
employ their subject matter to illustrate their own tech­
nical skill. The second order are poets like Keats and 
Tennyson whose emotions overcome their intellect. They 
see untruly and commit the pathetic fallacy. The first 
order, to which Homer and Dante belong, consists of poets 
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whose intellectual and emotional faculties are strong but 
balanced. There is a fourth, prophetic order, that of 
the Biblical prophets, whose strong intellects are over­
come by emotion nevertheless, when they contemplate certain 
God-made events (V, 209). 
It is important to emphasize that by "second order" 
Ruskin does not mean "second-rate."^® George Whaley makes 
this error when he says that Ruskin believes "second-rate 
art--or worse—arises from the inability to control emotion, 
and this failure is a sign of morbidity and weakness. 
It is not excess of feeling that Ruskin deplores, but the 
absence of feeling. As long as the emotion which causes 
the pathetic fallacy is true, then the fallacy is pleasant. 
But if the metaphor is not meant but done only for effect, 
then that is reprehensible. A true emotion means it comes 
from perceiving pure fact which gives rise to the emotion 
(V, 210-11) . 
Ruskin*s concern is always for a genuine communica­
tion of the essence of subject matter to the viewer or 
^^Ibid., 346. 
^^"Pathetic Fallacy," Queen's Quarterly, LVII 
(Winter, 1950), 522. 
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reader. He looks at the intent of the artist as revealed 
in the work of art to make this determination. A genuine 
error in the artist's mind is a natural fact. The artist 
cannot help it. If this results in a defective communica­
tion, then the work cannot be condemned. It is not the 
best, but it Is the best the artist, true to himself, can 
do. Through the pathetic fallacy, Ruskin is able to recon­
cile the paradox of defective beauty with truth. He does 
so by relating the pathetic fallacy to the truth of the 
12 mind, psychological truth. If there is no artifice in 
the appearance of the pathetic fallacy in a work of art, 
then the fallacy can be trusted and enjoyed. It is an 
imposition of the self upon natural fact, but as it cannot 
be helped, and as it is not an act of pride or pure tech­
nique, then It is moral. 
Ruskin places Scott in a category of his own in 
terms of Scott's response to Landscape. Scott neither re­
gards nature as being dead like Homer does, nor does he 
impose his own feelings upon it as Keats and Tennyson do. 
Rather, he senses nature as having a life of its own, in­
dependent of himself. He does not commit the pathetic 
^^Thomas, 347. 
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fallacy; he does not place himself above nature, but he 
puts nature above him. He instinctively senses something 
in nature, but he cannot identify it because of his lack 
of faith. As an example, Ruskin cites these lines from 
one of Scott's poems: 
Yon lonely thorn,--would he could tell 
The changes of his parent dell. 
Since he, so gray and stubborn now. 
Waved in each breeze a sapling boughI 
Would he could tell, how deep the shade 
A thousand mingled branches made. 
How broad the shadows of the oak. 
How clung the rowan to the rock. 
And through the foliage showed his head. 
With narrow leaves and berries red I 
Scott does not consider the thorn's grayness or stubborness 
because he feels dull or stubborn, nor does he consider 
the "cheerful peeping forth of the rowan^ because he him­
self is at that moment cheerful or curious." He perceives 
the thorn and rowan as he would were he considering an 
old man or a "climbing boy; forgetting himself, in sympathy 
with either age or youth" (V, 337-38). 
Scott displays the modern mind in general, "the 
instinctive sense which men must have of the Divine pres­
ence, not formed into distinct belief" (V, 338). The sense 
of animation is "universal . . . , only varying in depth 
according to the greatness of the heart that holds it" 
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(V, 339). As Scott is "more than usually intense, and 
accompanied with infinite affection and quickness of sym­
pathy," he conquers all tendency to the pathetic fallacy. 
He "paints" nature as she is, and he refuses to allow his 
own thoughts to intrude (V, 339). For this reason, Ruskin 
places Scott in an order which would be between the first 
and second orders (V, 340). Scott's deference to nature, 
the suppression of his ego, gives him a higher standing 
in Ruskin*s eyes. 
Ruskin cites various erroneous forms of art that 
have developed because artists took their eyes off their 
subject matter and for various reasons, chiefly pride in 
skill, produced their art according to technical concerns. 
He calls picturesque art a "spurious form" of landscape 
because it only displays "the skill of the artist, and his 
powers of composition; or to give agreeable forms and 
colours, irrespective of sentiment." An example of this 
art appears in modern Dutch paintings of street life and 
church interiors (VII, 255). 
This feeling for the merely picturesque was absent 
in Greek art. The Greeks saw land only in terms of its 
pleasantness, accessibility, and usefulness. The 
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picturesque entered art when Renaissance artists, ignoring 
the "truth," painted classical landscapes without a sense 
of "quiet natural grace, sweetness of asphodel meadows, 
tender aspen populars, or running vines." Instead, they 
painted only seaports or caves, the former appearing as 
bays of "insipid sea" and the latter as rocks with holes 
in them (V, 243-44). 
Technique was considered before subject matter 
in medieval times as well. Regard for the subject took 
one form when medieval art was used for communicative and 
identifying purposes on armor, shields, and flags. Although 
Ruskin excuses this departure because it served a real 
need, nevertheless, the practice furthered the obscuring 
of natural beauty in art (V, 259). 
Attention to technique also brought the downfall 
of Gothic art. Ruskin notes how a statue of the Madonna 
on Amiens Cathedral 
marks the culminating point of Gothic art, because, 
up to this time, the eyes of its designers had been 
steadily fixed on natural truth--they had been ad­
vancing from flower to flower, from form to form, 
from face to face,--gaining perpetually in knowledge 
and veracity--therefore, perpetually in power and in 
grace. 
But, there was a change: Attention shifted from the statue 
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to its niche and from floral ornament to the mouldings 
enclosing it. Where formerly imperfections had appeared 
in walls and statues in the builders* efforts to convey the 
significance of their subject, now perfect harmony between 
lines of the building and the statues became the builders' 
aim. A sense of calculation entered. Although this tech­
nical perfection produced a beautiful result, the builders 
developed pride in their skill. Where delight had been 
in the things they thought as they carved, now they con­
centrated on how cleverly they could put the stones to­
gether. Gothic art became 
a mere expression of wanton expenditure, and vulgar 
mathematics; and was swept away ... by the severer 
pride, and purer learning, of the schools founded on 
classical traditions. (XVI, 282-83) 
II. SEEING NATURE CLEARLY 
There is another reason why technique must be 
eliminated as a consideration in the artist's approach to 
his work. Seeing nature clearly, closely perceiving the 
mere physical qualities of the subject matter, is enough 
of a problem in itself. It is so challenging that it 
renders insignificant the role of the artist's self. 
Further, it is a far greater challenge to an artist's 
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skill than the mere mastery of a convention. Ruskin places 
this ability in its true perspective when he says. 
The greatest thing a human soul ever does in this world 
is to see something, and tell what it saw in a plain 
way. Hundreds of people can talk for one who can think, 
but thousands can think for one who can see. To see 
clearly is poetry, prophecy, and religion,--all in one. 
(V, 333) 
A "seer" is grounded to the world, the facts of his exist­
ence, much better than a thinker, who is given to ephemeral 
things, ideas not grounded in what has been seen: 
Metaphysics would, indeed, have led me far astray long 
ago, if I had not learned also some use of my hands, 
eyes, and feet. (V, 333-34) 
Great artists try to include, in their work, "the 
largest possible quantity of Truth in the most perfect 
possible harmony." As much of nature as possible should 
be included in the work of art. This inclusion of nature's 
diversity and variety in a harmonious relationship is a 
far greater testimony to an artist's skill, and devotion, 
than the elimination of as much as possible of nature for 
pleasing effect. Ruskin compares the work of two painters, 
Veronese and Rembrandt, to illustrate what he means. He 
considers Rembrandt inferior to Veronese because Rembrandt 
obscures most of a picture to bring out a single truth, 
such as the play of light on jewelry or faces. Veronese, 
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on the other hand, 
chooses to represent the great relations of visible 
things to each other, to the heaven above, and to the 
earth beneath them. He holds it more important to show 
how a figure stands relieved from delicate air, or 
marble wall; how as a red, or purple, or white figure, 
it separates itself, in clear discernibility, from 
things not red, nor purple, nor white; how infinite 
daylight shines round it; how innumerable veils of 
faint shadow invest it; how its blackness and darkness 
are, in excess of their nature, just as limited and 
local as its intensity of light; all this, I say, he 
feels to be more important than showing merely the 
exact measure of the spark of sunshine that gleams 
on a dagger-hilt, or glows on a jewel. (V, 58-59) 
The challenge of an accurate and complete portrayal of the 
truths of nature become fully evident in this passage. 
Yet, in his call for a complete rendition of nature, Ruskin 
is not calling for absolute clarity, the inclusion of every 
single detail. Such terms as "clear discernibility," "in­
finite daylight," and "intensity of light" must not give 
such an impression. He also refers to the "blackness and 
darkness" of "innumerable veils of faint shadow." It is 
in this dual condition of obscurity and clarity of nature 
that the artist's skill is challenged. The artist who, 
like Veronese, masters this aspect of nature has accomplish­
ed far more than one who simply masters a convention. 
The fact is that indistinctness is necessary if 
great art is to show the truth in nature: 
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. . . there is a continual mystery caused throughout 
all spaces, caused by the absolute infinity of things. 
WE NEVER SEE ANYTHING CLEARLY. . . . Everything we 
look at, be it large or small, near or distant, has 
an equal quantity of mystery in it. - . . What we call 
seeing a thing clearly, is only seeing enough of it 
to make out what it is I 
An open book and a handkerchief, for example, are indis­
tinguishable a quarter of a mile away. The mystery attaches 
to the whole of each object. Closer, we see the one is 
a book, the other a handkerchief, but we cannot read the 
one nor trace the embroidery in the other. The mystery 
exists in the details. But, after we can read the book 
and trace the embroidery, the mystery exists in the paper's 
fibres and the handkerchief's threads, and so on. The 
closer we perceive, the deeper goes the mystery. In this 
sense we do^not clearly see the book, even though we know 
it is one. When most artists paint an object, they get 
only close enough to recognize the object for what it is. 
But, there still is mystery as to finer details (VI, 75-76). 
Seeing clearly, then, is a relative term. 
Veronese, Titian, and Tintoretto produce works 
that are like nature in their being distinct generally, 
but obscure in fine details: 
. . . when compared with work that has no meaning, 
all great work is distinct,--compared with work that 
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has narrow and stubborn meaning, all great work. is 
indistinct. 
If everything in a painting can be clearly made out, it 
is not first-rate work: "EXCELLENCE OF THE HIGHEST KIND, 
WITHOUT OBSCURITY, CANNOT EXIST" (VI, 80-81). 
John D. Rosenberg says that Ruskin voices these 
arguments to answer critics' charges that he contradicts 
himself in calling for clarity in paintings while defending 
the misty nature of Turner's paintings. Ruskin is trying 
to show that Turner is superior to the idealizing Italian 
painters on the one hand and the Dutch realists on the 
other. Turner's superiority is that he lies between these 
two schools and most effectively represents nature as 
partially clear, partially obscure.Rosenberg goes on 
to say that in maintaining that an artist must be true 
to nature, Ruskin is not advocating photographic reproduc­
tion: 
For Ruskin nature was infinitely various, infinitely 
potent, but visible only to eyes which, in Wordsworth's 
phrase, half-create what they perceive. Imitation 
was impossible; the re-creation of part of nature's 
infinity was all the artist could hope for. Turner 
The Darkening Glass: A Portrait of Ruskin s 
Genius (New York, 1961), pp. 10-11. 
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created the largest segment, and was thus at once the 
most truthful and creative of landscapists. 
There is a moral reason why cloudiness or mistiness 
in a painting is good: It appeals to our sense of happi­
ness in having only partial knowledge of our existence. 
"If we insist upon perfect intelligibility and complete 
declaration in every moral subject, we shall instantly 
fall into misery of unbelief." We have an innate sense 
that only so much knowledge as we can bear is given us. 
To resent cloudiness and mistiness is a result of pride. 
Although "utter darkness and ignorance is indeed unmanly," 
to pursue knowledge and light because of pride is errone­
ous, too, "Men perished in seeking knowledge. ..." We 
must be humble and then our state of relative ignorance 
becomes pleasurable: 
. , . every rightly constituted mind ought to rejoice 
... in feeling that there is infinitely more which 
it cannot know. None but proud or weak men would mourn 
over this, for we may always know more if we choose, 
by working on, but the pleasure is ... to humble 
people3 in knowing that the journey is endless and the 
treasure inexhaustible. . . . (VI, 89-90) 
This is an example of Ruskin's dialectic. It is similar 
to that mentioned in the first section of this chapter, 
^^Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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that of losing one's ego to master one's art, which is 
a "losing" of one's "life" to find it. Here, Ruskin calls 
for the denial of one's understanding to'gain more under­
standing. Mistiness and obscurity in art, in showing this 
aspect of nature, reminds man of his ignorance and the 
need for continued study of his world. 
The indistinctness of nature in art attests to 
the mystery surrounding nature's origin, and communicates 
this question to the viewer. Such indistinctness occurs 
when a great artist deals with his perception of the un­
known, the province of highest knowledge. Ruskin states 
the paradoxical nature of "high" knowledge, whether of 
the spiritual world or physical nature, and its effect 
upon an artist's work: 
. . .  t o  k n o w  a n y t h i n g  w e l l  i n v o l v e s  a  p r o f o u n d  s e n ­
sation of ignorance, while yet it is equally true that 
good and noble knowledge is distinguished from vain 
and useless knowledge chiefly by its clearness and 
distinctness. . . . 
The best drawing involves a wonderful perception 
and expression of indistinctness; and yet all noble 
drawing is separated from the ignoble by its distinct­
ness . . . and firm assertion of Something; whereas 
bad drawing . . . asserts Nothing. (V, 60-61) 
In all this discussion about indistinctness, misti­
ness, and mystery, it must not be forgotten that Ruskin 
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deems clarity just as important, too. He is simply trying 
* 
to reconcile these opposite aspects of great art by identi­
fying them in nature first and then showing their place 
in art. The inclusion of these qualities in art is so 
complex that it is difficult to theorize. Great artists 
simply have the ability; but it can be developed, if, as 
Ruskin has emphasized earlier, the artist develops a pro­
per attitude toward his subject matter. This attitude is 
love, which suppresses the artist's pride in self and tech­
nique, things which obscure his powers of perceiving the 
complexity and challenge of nature, or subject matter. 
Lesser artists, considering only technique, make 
a fundamental error when they study this duality of clarity 
and obscurity in great art. "Dull" artists mistake "the 
mystery of great masters for carelessness, and their subtle 
concealment of intention for want of intention." Very 
few people can perceive the "delicacy, invention, and 
veracity" of Tintoretto or Reynolds. Even though Reynolds 
painted speedily, he rendered subtlety and tenderness in 
his brush-strokes. Obscurity can come from two different 
sources: *'lt is sometimes difficult to understand the 
words of a deep thinker; but it is equally difficult to 
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understand an idiot." The best thing that art students 
can do is try neither for obscurity nor clarity as ends 
in themselves: 
Mean something, and say something, whenever you touch 
canvas; yield neither to the affectation of precision 
nor of speed, and trust to time, and your honest labour, 
to invest your work gradually, in such measure and 
kind as your genius can reach, with the tenderness 
that comes of love, and the mystery that comes of power. 
(VI, 86-87) 
Noting the precise imitation of nature and its 
complexity as revealed in great works of art is a frequent 
admonishment of Ruskin. He desires art students to study 
only the greatest artists so that they can have a firm 
grasp of what great art is. With such knowledge and appre­
ciation of greatest art, they will have a standard by which 
they can judge not only their own work, but that of others. 
By studying the works of Titian, Veronese, and Tintoretto, 
young artists will become less concerned with passing fads 
and theories and more concerned about the qualities of 
these artist's works which have universal appeal. Ruskin 
recommends Reynolds and Turner as examples of modern artists 
who paint in the manner, or with the intent, of the earlier 
Venetian artists. By studying the excellence of modern 
artists, students will realize that great art is not 
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attached to any period in time, but that it may be pro­
duced in all times 'and nations. Ruskin hopes that the 
English will produce art as great as that of the Venetians 
(XVI, 314-18). 
Studying a great painting calls for the same con­
centration that studying nature does. Ruskin is his own 
best example. In July, 1858, at the Turin gallery in Italy, 
a visitor saw him examining Veronese's "The Queen of Sheba." 
E. T. Cook quotes the visitor's account: 
He was sitting all day upon a scaffold in the gal­
lery, copying bits of the great picture by Paul Vero­
nese, . . . One day ... I asked him to give me some 
advice. He said, "Watch me." He then looked at the 
flounce of a dress of a maid of honor of the Queen of 
Sheba for five minutes, and then he painted one thread: 
he looked for another five minutes, and then he painted 
another thread. At the rate at which he was working 
he might hope to paint the whole dress in ten years: 
but it was a lesson as to examining what one drew well 
before drawing it. 
Such is the challenge of seeing nature clearly. 
III. LOVE OF BEAUTY 
Bot only must the artist desire to capture the 
essence of his subject matter and reveal as many of its 
^^The Life of John Ruskin, 2nd ed. 2 vols. (Lon­
don, 1912), I, 521. 
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natural truths as possible, he must also have a love of 
beauty. But, the artist's aesthetic sense must be linked 
to his love of nature. That is, he must accept natural 
beauty rather than try to artificially produce beauty ac­
cording to formula or convention. This idea is inherent 
in Ruskin's stricture that beauty must be consistent with 
truth. He objects to either calling beauty truth, or truth 
beauty, for this is a confusion of two distinct but related 
ideas. Worse, in the identification of beauty with truth, 
beauty is pursued as a thing in itself, a practice which 
results in the artificiality of beauty, a question of tech­
nique only. Ruskin shows how the two terms are distinct 
by saying that a statement like "two and two make four" 
is true, "but it is neither beautiful nor ugly, for it 
is invisible: 
a rose is lovely, but it is neither true nor false, 
for it is silent. That which shows nothing cannot 
be fair, and that which asserts nothing cannot be 
false. (V, 55n) 
A work of art is true or false only when it purports to 
state facts. If a picture purports to show a man, dog, 
or tree, but in fact doesn't, it is false. When colors 
and lines purport to resemble something they do not, then 
they are false. Normally, their beauty is independent of 
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what they state. But, they may be ugly when they faith­
fully record ugly things: 
a picture may be frightfully ugly, which represents 
with fidelity some base circumstance of daily life; 
and a painted window may be exquisitely beautiful, 
which represents men with eagles' faces, and dogs with 
blue heads and crimson tails. ... If this were not 
so, it would be impossible to sacrifice truth to beauty; 
for to attain the one would always be to attain the 
other. (V, 55n) 
The problem with the school of "high art" is that it pursues 
beauty only. Truth should be sought first, and then beauty 
added, consistent with that truth. What Ruskin is basical­
ly doing is taking the middle, and more complex, ground be­
tween the "high school" of art, the Formalists, who despise 
nature, and the "low school," the Naturalists, who despise 
symbolism. Both of these schools fail to comprehend the 
1 fi wholeness of nature.-^" 
Just as nature, or the artist's subject matter, 
contains elements of clarity and obscurity, so, in terms 
of beauty, nature has elements of good and evil, beauty 
and ugliness. These elements are so intertwined and fused 
that to segregate them according to convention, formula, 
or theory is to produce a false aspect of the world. The 
artist's attitude toward his subject again enters as an 
16ibid., I, 343. 
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important consideration. He must subjugate himself in 
deference to a desire to communicate truth. Great art, 
for example, in depicting a large gathering of people, 
will not deny the facts of ugliness or decrepitude, 
or relative inferiority and superiority of feature 
as necessarily manifested in a crowd, but it will . . . 
seek for and dwell upon the fairest forms, and in all 
things insist on the beauty that is in them, not on 
the ugliness. (V, 56) 
What Ruskin calls false art "omits or changes all that is 
ugly": 
Great art accepts Nature as she is, but directs the 
eyes and thoughts to what is most perfect in her; 
false art saves itself the trouble of direction by 
removing or altering whatever it thinks objectionable. 
(V, 56-57) 
There is a sense of balance to be maintained, it seems, 
with the balance to be tipped slightly to the beautiful 
aspects of nature. When Ruskin calls for inclusion of 
the ugly with the beautiful, he also places the burden 
upon the author's skill in not allowing ugly features to 
dominate the beautiful. 
But as he criticizes the "high" school of art for 
its inclusion of beautiful things only, he may appear to 
emphasize ugliness. He warns against this kind of pre­
occupation, too. The greatest beauty comes from overcoming 
fear of evil or ugly things in life and using them in art 
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along with beauty. This the Greeks and Venetians did. 
The next highest beauty, that of northern European art, 
comes from not being able to conquer fear or evil, but 
"remaining in melancholy war with it." Lowest art is so 
conquered by evil that it unites with it and becomes sen­
sual. Salvator's work has this quality (VII, 271). The 
artist's greatness is to be seen in this delicate treat­
ment of the beautiful and ugly in nature. 
This discussion also extends to the frank portrayal 
of men. Although man is God's chief work, and his best 
art reveals him as such, nevertheless his full nature should 
be rendered. To paint him as having either a spiritual 
nature or an animal nature results from misunderstanding 
man as he is: 
For his nature is nobly animal, nobly spiritual--
coherently and irrevocably so; neither part of it 
may, but at its peril, expel, despise, or defy the 
other. All great art confesses both. (VII, 264) 
The single-minded pursuit of beauty results even­
tually in the loss of it. It is lost in two ways. First, 
beauty is better appreciated when it has ugly elements 
to set it off. To show sunshine, a painter must darken 
his canvas in appropriate areas. Beauty "must be foiled 
by inferiority before its own power can be developed." 
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The art of Angelico, who paints spiritual subjects, "is 
continually refreshed and strengthened by his frank por­
traiture of the most ordinary features of his brother 
monks." The schools of Raphael and the modern Germans, 
however, depict only beautiful faces, straight noses, and 
curled hair. But, "Veronese opposes the dwarf to the 
soldier, and the negress to the queen; Shakespeare places 
Caliban beside Miranda ..." (V, 57). 
The full range of beauty is also lost when it is 
abstracted from one's subject: 
The ugliest objects contain some element of beauty; 
and in all it is an element peculiar to themselves, 
which cannot be separated from their ugliness, but 
must either be enjoyed together with it or not at all. 
As the artist accepts nature as he finds it, he will dis­
cover beauty where he thought only ugliness was (V, 58). 
When beauty is divorced from its natural surround­
ings, it becomes artificial and ugly. This is what happened 
in the eighteenth century. As people sought beauty in 
artificial things, they were repelled by it. They "powdered 
the hair, patched the cheek, and hooped the body." This 
same kind of thinking resulted in brick walls and dim 
pictures: "Reaction from this state was inevitable. ..." 
Men were repelled by this artificial beauty of city life 
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to find the color, sweetness, light, and sense of liberty 
in the country that they instinctively desired (V, 324). 
The medieval ages are considered "Dark Ages," but 
the art of modern times reveal that these are the dark 
ages and medieval times were really brl^t. Modern people 
mechanically build their homes with brown bricks and clothe 
themselves in brown coats (V, 321-22): 
. , . whereas all the pleasure of the medieval was 
in stability, definiteness, and luminousness, we are 
expected to rejoice in darkness, and triumph in muta­
bility. ... (V, 317) 
Scott is an example of this modern flight from 
artificial beauty. He finds nature a unifying influence. 
He regains a sense of the past which cities obscure. He 
finds liberty where flowers and vines grow freely, and he 
finds the color, light, and variety of forms in nature 
which city life has practically eliminated. In nature 
Scott, as all moderns, is able to discover and unify all 
his various natural instincts (V, 345). 
That beauty is artificial rather than instinctual 
is a point upon which Ruskin criticizes Reynolds and those 
who consider art from a technical standpoint only. Beauty 
has become so divorced from reference to nature that 
Reynolds considers beauty a matter of custom rather than 
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instinct. It is this same thinking that resulted in the 
artificial beauty and eventual dullness from which men 
flee to the country (V, 325). Reynolds believes that if 
people were used to deformity, they would consider it 
beauty. Ruskin remonstrates: 
But the world has never succeeded, nor ever will, 
in making itself delight in black clouds more than 
blue sky, or love the dark earth better than the rose 
that grows from it. . . . The most subtle reasoner 
will . . . find that colour and sweetness are still 
attractive to him, and that no logic will enable him 
to think the rainbow sombre or the violet scentless. 
(V, 44-45) 
Part of Reynolds' problem is that he instirictively 
paints beauty, but when he tries to rationalize this in­
stinct, he errs: 
For nearly every word that Reynolds wrote was contrary 
to his own practice; ... he enforced with his lips 
generalization and idealism, while with his pencil he 
was tracing the patterns of the dresses of the belles 
of his day; ... he denied the existence of the beauti­
ful, at the same instant that he arrested it as it 
passed, and perpetuated it forever. (V, 46) 
Ruskin goes on to explain why Reynolds' performance 
varies with his pronouncements: The ten^tation to rational­
ize an instinct is natural. It is most evident when people 
sense degrees of beauty in works of art, and they try to 
explain to themselves and others why one work seems more 
beautiful than another. This tendency is good; one should 
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know why he likes certain works of art, but too frequently 
he tries to find the source of beauty in technique, some­
thing which lends itself more to rationalization than does 
the subtle communication of the artist's experience, which 
may be the actual source of beauty. Thus, concrete stand­
ards become formulated which do not conform to the real 
reasons why some artists seem greater than others, or, as 
in Reynolds* case, why he succeeds in painting beauty 
(V, 46). In addition to Reynolds* theory that great art 
differs from low art in terms of details, there are theories 
which state that the bigger in size a picture is, the 
"greater** it is. Another theory is that nude bodies make 
for greater art than clothed ones. A third is that the 
artist must never have seen what he paints, that only the 
past presents great subjects. A last erroneous theory is 
that painting must improve upon God's work (V, 46-47). 
In the light of what has already been said about Ruskin's 
feeling as to the artist's attitude toward nature or sub­
ject matter, it is easy to see why Ruskin would consider 
this last theory erroneous. The effect of such intellec-
tualizing is that it ignores the fact that men have a 
natural sense of beauty, and that great artists transfer 
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beauty from nature to canvas or page through this sense. 
As a result, this rationalizing ironically produces such 
false and unreasonable theories as those above. 
Beauty must be consistent with truth not only in 
showing the ugly in nature and the animal in man, it should 
also ally "higher" nature with "lower" nature. Neither 
aspect of the world should be isolated. For example, the 
statues on the exterior of the Cathedral of Chartres closely 
associate "the beauty of lower nature in animals and flowers, 
with the beauty of higher nature in human form. . . . Greek 
statues are always isolated; blank fields of stone, or 
depths of shadow, relieving the form of the statue. ..." 
By contrast, the clothed statue of Chartres seems to be 
the type of the Christian spirit--in many respects 
feebler and more contracted--but purer; clothed in 
its white robes and crown, and with the riches of all 
creation at its side. (XVI, 280) 
Evident in this passage is Ruskin's admiration of the 
Christian sculptor's devotion to his subject matter, his 
desire to communicate the wholeness of man's existence 
from spiritual to floral, beauty consistent with truth. 
An artist with this frame of mind can bring true beauty 
even into "lower" forms of art, such as furniture, dishes, 
and clothing, even though these items may not be considered 
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relevant to natural fact. Yet, Giotto, Ctellini, Holbein, 
and Michael Angelo all worked in these art forms as well 
as in the higher forms. Their regard for natural fact 
can be seen in these "lower" works (XVI, 288) . 
IV. INVENTION 
For all of Ruskin's emphasis upon the artist's 
attitude toward his subject, he is not discounting the 
role of the artist's imagination in producing great art. 
As a matter of fact, this element is the most important 
in Ruskin's art theory. Even though nature must be thor­
oughly perceived in all her complexity, there is room for 
the operation of the imagination. True perception of nature 
is only a starting point, a foundation, for young artists. 
They must concentrate on exact reproduction: 
Then, when their memories are stored and their imagina­
tions fed, and their hands firm, let them take up the 
scarlet and the gold, give reins to their fancy, and 
show us what their heads are made of.^^ 
There are two steps in the production of great art: 
First, the observation of facts; secondly, the mani­
festing of human design and authority in the way that 
fact is told. Great and good art must unite the two, 
^^Quoted in E. T. Cook, "Ruskin as an Artist and 
Art Critic," The Studio, XIX (March, 1900), 91. 
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it cannot exist for a moment but in their unity. . . . 
(XVI, 269-270) 
For these reasons Ruskin will accept a photograph because 
of its exact reproduction of nature. But, he does not 
see photography as a supplement or substitute for a paint­
ing because it omits the second step, at least in photo­
graphy's current stage of development. 
Invention is the term Ruskin uses to describe the 
operation of the imagination, and it acts in two ways. 
It either "entirely imagines its subject, or it arranges 
the materials presented to it" (V, 63). In both cases, 
however, the artist is able to conceive his subject in 
its entirety: ". . . partial conception is no conception. 
The whole picture must be imagined, or none of it is" 
(VII, 243). 
Just as the artist must submerge his ego to per­
ceive truly his subject matter, so he must continue this 
abnegation of the self in deference to this image that 
his invention presents to him. The qualities that Ruskin 
sees important in the artist for this condition to exist 
have moral value. To be true to the image in his mind, 
the artist must control his feelings, even though strong 
feeling is a necessity. Excessive emotion destroys 
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fidelity to the invented image. A calmness of mind is 
necessary to maintain the image; therefore no vain or sel­
fish person can paint nobly; "Vanity and selfishness are 
troublous, eager, anxious, petulant. ..." Further, the 
calmness must be natural; it cannot be forced. Rubens, 
Velasquez, Titian, and Veronese were all calm and unhurried 
as they painted the images in their minds. An artist cannot 
be shallow or petty, either; "Mere cleverness or special 
gift never made an artist. It is only perfectness of mind, 
unity, depth, decision, the highest qualities, in fine, 
of the intellect, which will form the imagination." Finally, 
"no false person can paint." He cannot perceive the whole­
ness of truth, only parts of it: 
It Is only the constant desire of, and submissiveness 
to truth, which can measure its strange angles and 
mark its infinite aspects; and fit them and knit them 
into the strength of sacred invention. (VII, 249-50) 
To transfer the invented image from the mind to the canvas 
is a delicate and complex act requiring far more than mere 
conscious effort. In calling invention a sacred quality, 
Ruskin says only an act of worship produces inventive art. 
Needless to say, attention to technique or conven­
tion merely gets in the way. The artist who has no invention 
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is always setting things in order, and putting the 
world to rights, and mending, and beautifying, and 
pluming himself on his doings as supreme in all ways. 
(V, 125) 
Not only do great artists work without following rules, 
but the power of an artist is inversely proportional to 
his following rules or principles. (V, 122) 
The first quality of invention, that of entirely 
imagining the subject, would seem to contradict Ruskin's 
stricture for a prior observance of nature as she is before 
using the imagination. This idea would be true were it 
not for the fact that visions in the mind are a kind of 
"inner" nature as opposed to the outer nature Ruskin is 
talking about. Basically, it has to do with man's religious 
sense; "sight of faith" is Ruskin's alternative term. 
Because it involves the same suppression of ego and tech­
nique that the true observance of outer nature calls for, 
Ruskin approves of it, although he holds it on a level 
below that of working from eyesight. Examples of this 
treatment of inner nature in art are seen in Ruskin's dis­
cussions of the "purist idealists" and the "grotesque 
idealists." The problem with the purist idealists is that 
they "shrink" from the everyday evils that are a part of 
external nature. They "endeavor to create for themselves 
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an imaginary state, in which pain and imperfection either 
do not exist, or exist in some edgeless and infeebled con­
dition." They draw everything "without shadows, as if 
the sun were everywhere at once." Although a modern 
artist knows better, these artists who lived in the thir­
teenth century did not. They were honestly expressing 
their personal spiritual affections and hopes. Angelico 
is an example. As a monk, his life was devoted to imagin­
ing the spiritual world. The exemplary qualities instilled 
in him enabled him to excel in expressing "the sacred af­
fections upon the human countenance." Further, he gave 
the best idea of spiritual beings. Although he is a true 
idealist, nevertheless he is not a master of his art. 
He did not paint the truth of experience (V, 103-105). 
The grotesque idealists demonstrate inventive power 
in their rendition of fictional beings. Although these 
artists have never seen such creatures, nevertheless their 
imaginations present them to them so strongly that the 
image is equivalent to eyesight. To illustrate his point, 
Ruskin compares the "true" griffin of a Lombard workman 
to a "false" griffin of a classical sculptor who worked 
according to convention. Because the Lombard saw his 
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griffin in his imagination so vividly, he succeeded not 
only in combining the physical features of a lion and eagle, 
but he also conveyed the essence of the lion and eagle. 
He managed to combine the rather indolent bulk of the lion 
with the streamlined alertness of the eagle. This sculp-
tored griffin, in its massiveness, supports a pillar re­
sulting in harmony between function and conception. The 
classical griffin, however, is merely omamental. The 
natural forms of lion and eagle are distorted to make the 
figure fit inside the boundaries of a frieze. The result 
is an unbelievable figure, rather than one that just might 
have existed (V, 145-47). 
The second function of invention, that of arranging 
the materials seen in outer nature, is more important than 
visions of the mind because it relates the viewer more to 
the world. There is common ground between artist and view­
er, so meaningful communication can take place. For this 
reason Ruskin makes evidence of imagination in a work of 
art the criterion of excellence. It is upon this basis 
that he draws the distinction between "poetical" and "his­
torical" art in preference to such technical considerations 
as variable or invariable detail: 
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. . .  t o  c r e a t e  a n y t h i n g  i n  r e a l i t y  i s  t o  p u t  l i f e  
into it. 
A poet, or creator, is therefore a person who 
puts things together, not as a watchmaker steel, or 
a shoemaker leather, but who puts life into them. 
His work is essentially this: it is the gathering 
and arranging of material by imagination, so as to 
have in it at last the harmony or helpfulness of life, 
and the passion or emotion of life. (VII, 215) 
Raskin defines poetry in the same manner that he 
defines great painting. It results when the poet imagina­
tively assembles facts of experience ("noble grounds") 
to give rise to "noble emotions." Such emotions would 
be "Love, Veneration, Admiration, and [unselfish] Joy," 
and the opposite emotions--"Hatred, Indignation . . ., 
Horror, and Grief. ..." The "noble grounds" for these 
emotions must be "large as well as just." For example, 
indignation is poetic when caused by serious injury, but 
not when one is cheated out of his money. But, the imagina­
tion must furnish the grounds of these emotions. Everyone 
has poetical feeling, or the noble emotions: "But, the 
power of assembling, by the help of the imag:ination, such 
images as will excite these feelings, is the power of the 
poet or literally of the 'Maker'" (V, 28-29). It is im­
possible, then, for a writer without invention to tell what 
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tools a true poet will make use of or how he will use them: 
"It is vain to say that the details of poetry ought to 
possess, or ever do possess, any definite character" 
(V, 30). 
Invention also plays a role in purely historical 
art as well. There are high and low orders of history in 
terms of the importance of the facts themselves, 
so that what with difference of subject, and what with 
difference of treatment, historical painting falls 
or rises in changeful eminence, from Dutch trivialities 
to a Velasquez portrait, just as historical talking 
or writing varies in eminence, from an old woman's 
story-telling up to Herodotus. 
When the imagination, or invention, enters in terms of 
the writer's commentary or arrangement of details, then 
the line between poetry and history may disappear. Yet, 
these two modes of writing should not be confused (V, 64) . 
Although historical art becomes higher as the imagination 
plays a greater role, the highest art is purely imagina­
tive, "all its materials being wrought into their form 
by invention. ..." As this "highest" art must deal with 
facts of experience, it includes historical art: "for 
all imagination must deal with the knowledge it has before 
accumulated; it never produces anything but by combination 
or contemplation" (V, 65). Further, excellent historical 
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art requires the same negation of self necessary to poeti­
cal art. After studying historical facts carefully, the 
artist lets "these truths . . . rise up and form the body 
of his imaginative vision. ..." He must then be able 
to "quit his own personality, and enter . . . into the 
hearts and thoughts of each person" (V, 124-25). 
Art which fulfills Ruskin's requirements of first 
observing nature closely, leaving nothing out, and then 
applying the inventive powers to arrange the subject matter 
is called "naturalist ideal" art. It accepts "the weak­
nesses, faults, and wrongnesses in all things that it sees, 
and it so places them and harmonizes them that they form 
a noble whole." For this reason this art is "that central 
and highest branch of ideal art" (V, 111). Shakespeare 
is one example. He "sees the truth wholly, and neither 
desires nor dares to mutilate it." He places Falstaff 
opposite his Prince Henry, Shallow opposite Falstaff, and 
Cordelia opposite Regan (V, 112-13). Homer is a naturalist 
idealist in that he shows imperfections or lownesses in 
perfect elements, such as Achilles cutting pork chops: 
For it is to be kept in mind that the naturalist ideal 
has always in it, to the full, the power expressed by 
those two words. It is naturalist, because studied 
from nature, and ideal, because it is mentally arranged 
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in a certain manner. Achilles must be represented cut­
ting pork chops, because that was one of the things 
which the nature of Achilles involved his doing: he 
could not be shown wholly as Achilles, if he were not 
shown doing that. But he shall do it at such time and 
place as Homer chooses. (V, 113) 
Linking the imagination to the facts of nature, 
or experience, is so important because the imagination can 
obscure nature as easily as the pursuit of technique can. 
When the imagination and technique become linked, then 
reality is totally obscured. No message about experience 
can be communicated, and the consequences have far-flung 
effects, especially in modern times. This idea lies behind 
Ruskin's warning in The Two Paths that when artificiality 
sets in as a result of ignoring nature, either through 
mere ornam,entation or following artistic rules, 
there is but one word for you--Death:--death of every 
healthy faculty, and of every noble intelligence, in­
capacity of understanding one great work that man has 
ever done, or of doing anything that it shall be help­
ful for him to behold. (XVI, 289) 
A noble person observes nature and the world "full in the 
face," understands these deeply and calmly deals with them. 
In so doing he furthers the good and reduces evil. The 
"ignoble" person, however, does not clearly see nature and 
the world for what they are. Understanding nothing, he is 
"swept away by the trampling torrent, and unescapable force" 
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of unforeseen and misunderstood things (XVI, 287). 
The sociological implications become evident when 
Ruskin describes the modern mind in terms of its ignoring 
fact and pursuing imaginary things. The preoccupations 
of a society becomes evident in their art and lives, and 
Ruskin sees these preoccupations in terms of the ignoble 
person. 
Modern people do not follow their "proper business" 
in the world, which are: to know themselves and what in 
life they must deal with; to be happy with themselves and 
the world; and to improve themselves and the world. They 
remain ignorant, unhappy, and indolent because they do 
not face disagreeable facts. Instead, they become "a 
species of instinctive terror at all truth" and they love 
"glosses, veils, and decorative lies of every sort." 
Further, they have "a general readiness to take delight 
in anything past, future, far off, or somewhere else, 
rather than in things now, near, and here." For these 
reasons they pursue what Ruskin calls a "false ideal" in 
art and literature. In doing so they abuse their imagina­
tions (V, 71) . 
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In the development of this false ideal in art, 
Ruskin traces the separation of the imagination from nature, 
and its alliance with technique to form "ideal beauty," 
or false beauty. This separation first took place in the 
vision-making aspect of invention, when artists began to 
paint religious imagery without believing in it. In the 
thirteenth century this imagery "consisted merely in sim­
ple outlines and pleasant colours, which were understood 
to be nothing more than signs of the thing thought of. 
. . ." It only suggested the idea, and the viewer "went 
on to form truer images for himself" (V, 73). For example, 
a symbolic depiction of the Nativity appeared in the Bible, 
and the reader was not distracted from the text. He saw 
it only as illustrating the meaning of such words as "wrapped 
Him in swaddling clothes, and laid Him in a manger" (V, 74). 
It is important to note that the symbolism is subordinate 
to the experience that is to be conveyed. Symbolic presen­
tation is not pursued as a thing in itself; the only reason 
exact reproduction is impossible is because technical skill 
is not developed. But, when skilled artists "with exquisite 
power of representing the human form, and high knowledge 
of the H^rsteries of art, devoted all their skill to the 
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delineation of an impossible scene," then people's attention 
was attracted to the art itself. The Madonna appeared as 
queenly lady, her dress embroidered with gold, and 
with a crown of jewels upon her hair, kneeling, on 
a floor of inlaid and precious marble, before a crowned 
child, laid under a portico of Lombardic architecture; 
with a sweet, verduous, and vivid landscape in the 
distance, full of winding rivers, village spires, and 
baronial towers. . . . the continual presentment to 
the mind of this beautiful . . . imagery . . . chilled 
its power of apprehending the real truth. . . . (V, 75) 
The real truth is that the Madonna was "a plain Jewish 
girl." 
These early Christian artists, however, genuinely 
believed they were worshipping the Madonna and Christ when 
they painted the Nativity in a glorified manner. They were 
trying to express "the enthusiastic state" of their own 
feelings about the fact. Such an artist 
covers the Virgin's dress with gold, not with any idea 
of representing the Virgin as she ever was, . . . but 
with a burning desire to show what his love and 
reverence would think fittest for her. (V, 76) 
These "purist idealists," like the writers who commit the 
pathetic fallacy, are not condemned by Ruskin in their 
representing other than actual fact. He sees both groups 
proceeding from a genuine state of mind, a result of psy­
chological truth, religious faith in the former and emotion 
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in the latter. It is interesting to point out that these 
two groups are on opposite sides of the religious coin 
as far as Ruskin is concerned, but he accepts both their 
work. The purist idealists depart from factual representa­
tion by great faith; the committers of the pathetic fallacy 
err by no faith. The saving factor in both groups is their 
lack of calculation or pursuit of technique in their work. 
They perform according to what genuinely lies in their 
minds. 
When these religious artists, however, did turn 
their attention to technique instead recording early Christ­
ian experience or elaborating their faith, then a complete 
separation between imagination and experience was effected: 
"In early times art was employed for the display of reli­
gious facts; now, religious facts were employed for the 
display of art" (V, 77). The Madonna, for example, was 
seen only with a mechanical eye 
as an available subject for the display of transparent 
shadows, skillful tints, and scientific foreshorten-
ings,--as a fair woman, forming, if well painted, a 
pleasant piece of furniture for the corner of a bou­
doir. ... It was thus that Raphael thought of the 
Madonna. (V, 78) 
With the imagination dazzled by technique, reli­
gious faith faded into the background. This pursuit of 
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ideal beauty, or the false ideal, brought secular, or "pro­
fane" art, into existence: 
as long as men sought for truth first, and beauty 
secondarily, they cared . . . for the chief truth, 
and all art was instinctively religious. But as soon 
as they sought for beauty first, and truth secondarily, 
they were punished by losing sight of spiritual truth 
altogether, and the profane . . . schools of art were 
instantly developed. (V, 91) 
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The imagination became so far removed from fact of exper­
ience that it dealt with fictitious subject matter in which 
the artist did not believe. "Heathen" mythology supplied 
examples for artists who discarded the robes of subjects 
in religious art to display the "nobility of nakedness" 
of the human form. Ruskin notes how this pursuit of false 
ideal beauty led to an extreme: 
Formerly, though they attempted to reach an un­
natural beauty, it was yet in representing historical 
facts and real persons; now they sought for the same 
unnatural beauty in representing tales they knew to 
be fictitious, and personages who, they knew, had never 
existed. Such a state of things had never before been 
found in any nation. . . . The ideal art of modern 
Europe was the shadow of a shadow; and, with mechanism 
substituted for perception, and bodily beauty for 
spiritual life, it set itself to represent men it 
had never seen, customs it had never practised, and 
gods in whom it had never believed. (V, 92-93) 
Vices became depicted because virtue lay only in displaying 
truth. Subject matter became brutal or sensual. Battle 
slaughters, orgies, "grotesque fiends," and "picturesque 
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infernos" were depicted. More seriously3 Biblical and myth­
ological forms were used to flatter important people in 
their portraits (V, 93). 
As stated earlier, this separation between the 
imagination and experience, or "truth," has broad negative 
sociological effects. The inventive powers of the imagina­
tion create an unreal vision of the world. Men make a 
mistake when they try to ignore the evil and misery that 
is coexistent with the good. In the midst of God's beauty. 
He also provides a warning: 
. . . this I know . . . that no good or lovely thing 
exists in this world without its correspondent dark­
ness; and that the universe presents itself continually 
to mankind under the stern aspect of warning, or of 
choice, the good and the evil set on the right hand 
and the left. (VI, 416) 
But, like the early Christians, some modern artists 
tend to ignore the effect that "the elements of decay, 
danger, and grief in visible things" have on people's lives. 
Believing that all would turn out good in the attainment 
of Heaven despite life's problems, such artists gloss over 
the true depths such problems have in hu^n life: 
It may perhaps be thought that this Is a very high and 
right state of mind. 
Unfortunately, it appears that th,e attainment of 
it is never possible without inducing some form of 
intellectual weakness. (VIII, 267) 
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Men, especially artists and writers, should not 
be content to look at "the bright side" of things because 
of religious optimism. To do so results in ignoring the 
actual effects of evil and blinds them from perhaps helping 
others. God has given man two sides, and He has "intended 
us to see both." A Scotch clergyman, for example, rhap-
sodically describes a Highland scene as evidence of God's 
work. Ruskin has also seen such a view, but it included 
the carcass of an ewe rotting in a stream with oily waters. 
Further down the stream a man and boy were fishing: "a 
picturesque and pretty group ... if they had not been 
there all day starving" (VII, 267-69). 
The fact is that natural beauty, such as that of 
mountains, has no aesthetic relationship to the lives of 
the people living on their slopes and in their valleys. 
One may think that there is "innocence and peace, and 
fellowship of the human soul with nature. It is not so." 
These people know nothing of beauty or knowledge and little 
of virtue. They live hard lives, gleaning a bare existence 
from the rocky soil; 
For them, there is neither hope nor passion of spirit; 
for them neither advance nor exhultation. Black bread, 
rude roof, dark night, laborious day, weary arm at 
sunset; and life ebbs away. 
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Paradoxically, English cottages, situated in "dull flat 
fields and uninteresting hedgerows" are neat and cheerful-
looking due to "energy of heart, and happiness in the simple 
course and simple possessions of daily life." But, the 
mountain cottage, amidst "inconceivable, inexpressible 
beauty" is a "dark and plague-like stain" on the landscape 
(VI, 388-89). 
In contrast to this reality, this truth of nature, 
rich London and Parisian play-goers pursue the false ideal 
when they watch idealized plays which show mountain people 
as being cheerful, carefree, and happy: 
If all the gold that has gone to paint the simulcra 
of the cottages, and to put new songs in the mouths 
of the simulcra of the peasants, had gone to brighten 
the existent cottages, and to put new songs into the 
mouths of the existent peasants, it might in the end, 
perhaps, have turned out better so, not only for the 
peasants but for even the audience. (VI, 390) 
This pursuit of the false ideal occurs in literature 
as well. People succeed in allowing their imaginations to 
obscure natural truth, the consequence of which is that 
nothing is done to cure social ills. People instead follow 
the "vagaries of their minds." They read "senseless fic­
tions" instead of the "real human histories" around them. 
They pursue "romantic historical deceptions," or they "take 
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pleasure" in "fanciful portraits of rural or romantic life 
in poetry and on the stage, without the smallest effort 
to rescue the living rural population . . . from its ignor­
ance or misery" (V, 100-101). 
This modern pursuit of false ideal beauty, as op­
posed to beauty that is both naturalist and ideal, causes 
men to shun even the present. They go to their imaginations 
which reveal to them the beauty of their ancestors and of 
the past in general. Ruskin notes a contradiction in modern 
life in regard to the past that did not exist in older 
societies: we say we've surpassed the accomplishments 
of the past, yet we long for a past way of life. The older 
societies valued their accomplishments, but they did not 
desire a past way of life: "The Greeks and medievals 
honoured, but did not imitate their forefathers; we imitate, 
but do not honour" (V, 325). 
Great art, to Ruskin, is not defineable in terms 
of technique, but rather in terms of the mental make-up 
of the artist, especially in his ignoring technique or 
convention in preference to seeing accurately the essence 
of his experience. All aspects of man are utilized in 
producing great art: 
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For as (1) the choice of the high subject involves 
all conditions of right moral choice [through negation 
of the self] , and as (2) the love of beauty involves 
all conditions of right admiration [evil with good, 
ugly with beautiful] , and as (3) the grasp of truth 
involves all strength of sense, evenness of judgment, 
and honesty of purpose [to show nature as she is], 
and as (4) the poetical power involves all swiftness 
of invention, and accuracy of historical memory, the 
sum of all these powers is the sum of the human soul. 
Hence, the word "Great" applies to such art. All lower 
art calls forth only part of the human spirit (V, 65-66), 
and this is the problem with modern art and society. All 
these qualities are necessary for a true communication 
between artist and viewer to take place. And, it is the 
difficulty of attaining all these qualities that renders 
consideration of technique an insignificant, or at best, 
an interfering, matter. 
The complexity of stating the different sides of 
great art as a product of the soul, or whole man, lay at 
the bottom of Ruskin's apparent contradictions in Modern 
Painters I and II. Found among his papers after his death 
was a statement intended for addition to some material 
in Stones of Venice. This statement reveals his realization 
of why error and contradiction had been attributed to him. 
The problem was his trying to express art principles broadly; 
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yet, in doing so, he opened himself to dual interpretations 
of what he had said about fact against design in art: 
It was assumed that all great . . . art was essen­
tially Ideal or of the Soul, as distinguished from the 
lower art which is principally the body. . . . There 
is not a definite separation between the two kinds. . . . 
Only exactly in proportion as the Soul is thrown into 
it, the art becomes Fine; and not in proportion to any 
amount of practice, ingenuity, strength, knowledge, 
or other calculable and saleable excellence thrown 
into it. . . . This one truth I have throughout had 
at my heart--variously struggling and endeavoring to 
illustrate it--according to the end immediately in 
view. 
Yet, even though the Soul must be added, not all 
great artists possess all the elements in equal degree. 
Some may be more inventive, and others tend more to the 
realistic aspects. It is these contradictory or inde­
pendent elements that cause people to rank great artists. 
But, one artist is not greater or lesser than another be­
cause he tends one way or the other. The fact that all 
the elements are present renders him great (V, 66-67). 
An example is Titian, who unifies all these elements of 
the soul so delicately that different people see different 
things in his art, although not to the degree they would 
like. Sensualists find sensuality in him, thinkers, thought; 
^^Quoted in Cook, The Life of John Ruskin, I, 341-42. 
81 
saints, sanctity; colorists, color; and anatomists, form. 
A Titian picture is never overwhelmingly popular, because 
no one element dominates. Lesser painters, with dominant 
qualities, are loudly praised. Yet a deep murmur persists 
through the centuries and this timeless, quiet approval 
attests to his greatness (XVI, 297-98). 
CHAPTER III 
GREATNESS IN SOCIETY 
Raskin's social criticism parallels his art criti­
cism. As he attacks the "lifeless conventions of contem­
porary art," so he attacks the materialistically-oriented 
doctrines of the political economists.^ The idea of an 
"Economic Man." is as repulsive to him as the idea of an 
"Aesthetic Man." He is trying to establish a link between 
art and common life on the one hand and economics and com­
mon life on the other. He sees the esthete and the philis-
tine as each pursuing one half of the total life. The 
economist, in his emphasis upon theory, and the esthete, 
in his emphasis upon convention or technique, both neglect 
nature, or experience. Neither considers that greatness 
is not possible in either art or society unless the human 
soul's preeminence becomes recognized. 
t 
Frederick W. Roe, The Social Philosophy of Carlyle 
and Ruskin (New York, 1921), p. 170. 
«• . 
John D. Rosenberg, The Darkening Glass; A Portrait 
of Ruskin's Genius (New York, 1961), p. 21. -
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Although there is not an exact correspondence be­
tween the qualities necessary for great art and those nec­
essary for greatness in a society, nevertheless Ruskin 
calls for basically the same manner of thinking. What 
he calls for in society is the same negation of self that 
he calls for in art. In society, however, the self is 
to defer to the promotion of human life in an educational 
and cultural as well as material sense. Humanity replaces 
nature in Ruskin's social criticism. 
For this deference to take place, the qualities 
men need are faith, affection, unselfishness, and coopera­
tion. All these qualities are nearly identical, but they 
progress from purely spiritual matters to specific social 
actions. Further, they are a recognition of man's soul 
as the key to a society's greatness, just as the presence 
of the soul is necessary for great art. 
I. FAITH 
Much of Ruskin's criticism of modern art centers 
around its testimony to man's loss of faith. In a like 
manner, he sees the darkness and sadness of modern society 
as the result of this faithlessness. Savages, he says, 
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have more belief in a divinity than cultured Europeans. 
Those who do believe are divided into Romanists and Puri­
tans, who wish only to destroy each other. This division 
"between persons nominally of one religion" has "become 
a stumbling block ... to all thoughtful and far-sighted 
men. . . . 
Hence, nearly all our powerful men . . . are unbelievers; 
the best of them in doubt and misery; the worst in reck­
less defiance; the plurality, in plodding hesitation, 
doing, as well as they can, what practical work lies 
ready to their hands.... 
In politics, religion is now a name; in art, a 
hypocrisy or affectation. . . . All sincere and modest 
art is . . . profane.^ 
Scott is an example of this faithlessness, or at best "wa­
vering belief." He is a Presbyterian only because he lives 
in Edinburgh, Scotland: 
He thinks Romanism more picturesque, and profaness 
more gentlemanly; does not see that anything affects 
human life but love, courage, and destiny; . . . not 
matters of faith . . . , but of sight. (V, 336) 
Scott considers religion only as a matter of form, which 
is the same sort of thinking that Ruskin sees fatal in art. 
^!he Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook and 
Alexander Wedderburn, Library Edition, 39 vols. (London, 
1903-1912), V, 322-323. Reference to this edition will 
be by volmae and page number, and will be included in 
the text. 
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As a result there is a dichotomy in English society 
between professed religion and a conscious "disobedience 
of its first principles" as national policy. Christianity 
condemns the love of money and the desire for material 
things, but "we forthwith investigate a science of becoming 
rich as the shortest road to national prosperity" (XVII, 
75-76). This dichotomy brings confusion and paradox into 
church doctrine. Churches preach that one must war against 
the "world." Ruskin wonders if this is the same world 
as the one people are to "get on in." The Bible inveighs 
against spiritual evil in the world but not against the 
world itself: "God loved the world . . Christ is the light 
of it." On Judgment Day, the Bible says, men will not 
leave this world, but God's kingdom will come to it (VII, 
457-59). 
This unification between God and the earth takes 
place in man. Man's soul is the image of God, and it has, 
from the beginning, reflected Him. It has never changed, 
although it has been defiled: 
We are not made now in any other image than God's. 
There are, indeed, the two states of this image--
the earthly and heavenly, but both Adamite, both 
human, both the same likeness; only one defiled, 
and one pure. So that the soul of man is still a 
mirror, wherein may be seen, darkly, the image of 
the mind of God. (VII, 260) 
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II. AFFECTION 
But, separation between spiritual and material 
concerns, between belief and practice, is a result of loss 
of faith, and so man's nature is divided as well. Atten­
tion to his soul is ignored, while attention to his body, 
as an economic tool, dominates. Unbelief in God, then, 
results in an unbelief in humanity. People adopt the idea 
that man is a brute, that "all motive force in him is es­
sentially brutish, covetous, or contentious." But, man 
is never motivated by these things, but rather by love and 
trust. The greatest scientific discoveries and artistic 
works were not done for pay at all. This belief that man 
is a brute has led to the wrong ways of getting men to 
work. Large amounts of money have not brought significant 
results. Only love and trust extended to the able will 
bring results (VII, 448-52). 
The problem with the political economists is that 
they dissociate social action from "social affection." 
They call the social affections "accidental and disturbing 
elements in human nature; but avarice and the desire of 
progress are constant elements." They wish to eliminate 
the "inconstant" affections and to consider man as merely 
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a "covetous machine" in order to determine how the greatest 
amount of material wealth can be obtained. Then the var­
iable "affectionate element" may be added to determine, 
as each individual wishes, the result of the new conditions. 
But, the affections are not a quantitative, but a qualita­
tive element. They do not simply become an addition to 
the "constant" factors, but they alter these factors. 
Therefore, a social science which proceeds without taking 
the affections into consideration becomes as inapplicable 
to reality as a science of gymnastics which discounts the 
human skeleton. To alter the human form and then to try 
to reinsert the skeleton renders such a process ludicrous. 
As such a science ignore's man's skeleton, so the current 
science of political economy ignores man's soul and sup­
poses that man is all skeleton (XVII, 25-27). 
The inapplicability of economic theory, as it 
exists, to reality or experience, can be seen in current 
workmen's strikes, a situation which the economists are 
powerless to solve. The reason for these strikes is that 
workers and masters believe that because their interests 
differ, they must be against each other. If both sides 
would consider the work that must be done, then they would 
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not be so antagonistic. The question of whether or not 
their interests differ is pointless. What must regulate 
their relationship is a sense of justice. This sense of 
justice must be based upon the "affections as one man owes 
to another" (XVII, 28). 
These affections issue out of man's soul, and it 
is the negation of the soul as man's chief motive power 
that renders the economic theories nugatory. Man cannot 
be treated or theorized about as if he were a machine, 
because only one part of his true nature is considered. 
This idea of man's soul "enters into all the political 
economists' equations . . . and falsifies . . . their re­
sults" (XVII, 29). 
If affection governs the relationship between worker 
and master, then more material benefits occur for the mas­
ter. The good that a worker renders will exceed material 
concerns in "protective watchfulness of his master's in­
terest and credit," and in "joyful readiness to seize un­
expected and irregular occasions of help" (XVII, 30). 
The role of the affections in the worker here is analogous 
to that of the devotion of the artist toward his subject 
matter. The removal of material, or technical concerns. 
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in both cases results in increased effort toward accomplish­
ing the goal: good art from the artist, better production 
from the worker. Ruskin's idea that work is good and not 
an evil to be shunned, runs counter to the assumptions 
of the political economists. From his observance of art, 
the professions, and handicrafts, he early realized that 
wages are not the only incentives to work.^ 
Ruskin's mode of inquiry along these lines has 
led to its being termed basically scientific, rather than 
merely sentimental. But, Derrick Leon points out that 
his mind went beyond mere scientific inqsairy, it 
went beyond the "merely rational horizon," and by the 
vision of categorical truth thus got was guided by 
a deeper understanding of facts and their laws, than 
is possible to a Darwin, a Huxley or a Metchnikoff. 
. . . The tendency of Victorian science was to prove 
man a mechanism: whereas the whole of Ruskin's work 
went to show that this was precisely what he was not--
and could not become, without disaster to soul and 
body, individual and race.^ 
Huskin*s economic criticism is not limited to 
worker-master relationships only. He considers the rela­
tionship between the rich and the poor, the broader aspect 
^John A. Hobson, John Ruskin, Social Reformer 
(Boston, 1898), pp. 79-80. 
^Ruskin: The Great Victorian (London, 1949), 
pp. 276-277. 
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of the worker-master relationship. The "captains of in­
dustry" must consider the effects of their activities on 
other people. The kind of mind "which pursues its own 
interests at any cost of life" is deplorable, even if the 
evil caused is unintended. An intentional evil act shows 
that the doer knows right from wrong. But pursuing one's 
own economic way, ignorant of the hardships caused, is 
a worse state of mind (XVI, 405). The reason that such 
ignorance is deplorable is that the actor must first be 
convinced that he is responsible for a condition for which 
he does not feel responsible. The mere suggestion of 
change may be regarded as an insult, hardening him all 
the more in his self-satisfaction. 
To be relevant, the science of political economy 
must therefore cease its teaching that the sole concern 
of men is how to get rich, and also consider that as some 
men get rich, others get poor (XVII, 43-44). Once people 
realize this fact, then they will carefully consider the 
justice with which their wealth is obtained, rather than 
consider quantity only. Wealth accumulated through just 
actions signifies a general prosperity, since no one has 
been cheated or mistreated. If gotten unjustly, then "that 
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which seems to be wealth may ... be only the gilded in­
dex of far-reaching ruin ..." (XVII, 53). It is not 
enough to "buy in the cheapest market and sell in the 
dearest." Rather, one must see why the one market is 
cheap, and the other is dear. No person can know all 
this; he can only know if his own transactions are "just 
and faithful" (XVII, 53-54). 
But, the rich will come face-to-face with the 
poor. This is as much a natural fact as streams flowing 
into the ocean. How the rich and poor interact depends 
on the justness with which the poor are treated. Yet, 
justice is the very thing that the rich are most hesitant 
to give (XVII, 59-60). They prey upon the poor, instead. 
The reason crime and misery exist is the misapprehension 
of one truth, that "a certain quantity of work is necessary 
to produce a certain quantity of good. ..." The rich, 
however, try to get their needs for nothing or on the 
efforts of others. 
Instead of helping others overcome difficulties, 
the rich use these difficulties to advantage. For example, 
if, due to distress, poor producers must sell at less than 
full value, the rich take advantage of them (XVI, 396). 
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The poor need more than material things, however: 
The life is more than the meat. The rich not only 
refuse food to the poor; they refuse wisdom; they re­
fuse virtue; they refuse salvation. (XVII, 107) 
To help bring these more important intangibles to the poor 
working classes, Ruskin taught at the Working Men's Col­
lege, which was to make available to the working classes, 
as Edward T. Cook says, "the same kind of education that 
the upper classes enjoyed: 
It saw in education a means of life as well as of 
livelihood. It sought not to help working-men to 
"get on" and "rise out of their class," but to im­
prove themselves by satisfying the needs of their 
mental and spiritual natures." 
Material advancement is not Ruskin's purpose in his social 
criticism. People must seek only to be happy in the world 
rather than rise in it. They must resolve 
to seek--not greater wealth, but simpler pleasure; 
not higher fortune, but deeper felicity; making the 
first of possessions, self-possession; and honoring 
themselves in the harmless pride and calm pursuits 
of peace. (XVII, 112) 
Such statements give Ruskin's ideas a paradoxical 
appearance--calling for better treatment of the poor, yet 
denying them the same right to property that the rich have. 
C. 
Edward T. Cook, The Life of John Ruskin, 2nd ed. 
2 vols. (London, 1912), I, 378. 
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This appearance comes from Ruskin's looking through simple 
material concerns to the deeper needs of men. His penetra­
tive imagination, as it perceives men's hearts and discerns 
their true motivating force, brings the realization that 
simple recognition of their humanity, and treatment accord­
ingly, is what makes them happy: "The life is more than 
the meat." There is a middle ground between stagnation 
and revolution, and Ruskin seeks this ground. Therefore, 
as Cook says. 
He was a Republican as against institutions or laws 
which oppressed the poor; and a conservative as against 
theories and reforms which were based on doctrines of 
liberty and equality. 
Ruskin cannot be called a socialist, because he 
fears division of property like he fears every other form 
of division. The rich do not deprive the poor by merely 
having property, but rather it is the misuse of property 
that deprives the poor: 
Riches are a form of strength; and a strong man does 
not injure others by keeping his strength, but by 
using it injuriously, (XVII, 106n) 
His relegation of material concerns to second place dis­
gruntled leftists and rightists who saw the issues in 
^Ibid., I, 273. 
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material terms only. John D. Rosenberg says that Ruskin 
did not desire to "invalidate the security of property." 
Rather, he desired to 
extend its range and whereas it has long been known 
and declared that the poor have no right to the pro­
perty of the rich, I wish it also to be known and 
declared that the rich have no right to the property 
of the poor.® 
There may be some inconvenience to the rich, how­
ever, if they extend justice and knowledge to the poor. 
They may have to forego a few of their luxuries. But, 
such will only be a temporary condition until all people 
achieve a decent standard of living. Then those who can 
afford more things may have them. However, 
luxury at present can only be enjoyed by the ignorant; 
the cruelest man living could not sit at his feast, 
unless he sat blindfold. (XVII, 114) 
IIIo UNSELFISHNESS 
The idea that social wrongs are artificial and 
not natural lies behind Ruskin's belief that God has so 
organized the world that if a man works well, he should 
have life's necessities, plus a few luxuries, rest, and 
^Rosenberg, pp. 108-109. 
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leisure. In terms of a nation, it is the misapplication 
or insufficiency of labor that results in misery, hard­
ship, and unemployment. Man's error causes economic pro­
blems; the world is not naturally constituted so (XVI, 
18-19). 
One of the ideas that Ruskin sees as the kind of 
artificiality that blinds people from the true ends of 
a society is their restricted concept of money, wealth, 
and value. In Unto This Last Ruskin sets out to redefine 
these economic terms in their full implications. The purely 
theoretical science of political economy had limited these 
tems in justifying the processes of industrialism. Parody­
ing the reasoning of the political economists, Ruskin poses 
definitions of money, wealth, and value in their broadest 
and historical sense. Thus, he exposes the incompleteness 
of contemporary economic theories. 
Basically, the purpose of a society is not to make 
a few rich at the expense of many, but rather to make life 
a joyful experience for everyone. With this idea in mind, 
Ruskin broadens the concept of money, for example. When 
many people need the essentials of life, how one spends 
his money is important. He should not spend his money 
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only on himself, thinking that he is giving others work. 
He must also consider the kind of work to which he is 
putting them. Instead of buying one expensive suit of 
clothes, a person should buy six cheaper suits, wear one 
and give five away. In this way the workers will receive 
the benefits of their labors much sooner (XVI, 48). 
People must not think that their money is their 
own and that they may spend it however they wish. They 
get this idea because they think that money is not God-
given like talent, intellect, or good birth. Although 
the money itself may not be God-given, the ability to earn 
it is. Therefore, it should not be used to deprive others, 
but to help them. People scorn a physical bully, but not 
an economic one. The poor exist for the rich to help, and 
this is why the ability to make money is God-given (XVI, 
99-103). 
Most people equate "value" with how much money 
a thing is worth. This is another artificial idea that 
obscures reality. The Latin root word for "value" means 
to be strong m life, or valiant as applied to men. In 
reference to things it means to be strong for life: "To 
be 'valuable,' therefore, is to 'avail towards life.'" 
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If an article does not "lead to life," then it is less 
valuable. The term, "value," in a true science of politi­
cal economy, "teaches nations to desire and labour for 
the things that lead to life. ..." As air, light, clean­
liness, peace, trust, and love are more conducive to life 
than gold or iron, they are more valuable (XVII, 84-85). 
In his redefinition of value, Ruskin is again 
scientific rather than sentimental. Patrick Geddes, in 
John Ruskin, Economist (1884), notes how closely Ruskin's 
social criticism follows scientific biological fact, that 
"intrinsic value is the absolute power of anything to 
support life." Geddes continues: 
The inductive logic and statistics, the physics and 
chemistry, the biology and medicine, the psychology 
and education were all essentially on the side of 
Mr. Ruskin; while on the other were too often sheer 
blindness to the actual facts of human and social 
life-organism, function, and environment alike.^ 
As he redefines "value" in terms of its contribu­
tion to life, so Ruskin redefines "wealth." He questions 
Mill's definition of wealth as meaning "to have a large 
stock of useful articles." He examines "have" as a quality 
of possession and "useful" as a quality of utility. What 
^Quoted in Cook, II, 135. 
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is the nature of possession and utility? To possess an 
article depends upon the ability of the "possessor" to use 
it. A dead saint, clasping a gold cross in his coffin, 
cannot be said to "have" it, nor can a man sinking in the 
ocean with two hundred pounds of gold strapped to him be 
said to possess the gold. Sometimes a person cannot con­
trol an object, even though he may "own" it. Thus "wealth" 
is expanded to mean "the possession of useful articles 
which we can use" or control. Ruskin, in characteristic 
fashion, shifts attention from the object to the person. 
Here, the ability of the possessor determines the "wealth" 
of an item, not the inherent characteristics of the item 
itself (XVII, 86-87). 
"Use" implies its opposite, "ab-use." Whether or 
not an article is useful depends upon the person. Wine 
had a dual aspect to the Greeks. As Bacchus, it was useful 
in "cheering god and man." That is, it strengthened both 
the reasoning and carnal powers of man. As Dionysus, wine 
hurt man's spiritual and bodily powers. The Greeks also 
considered that the human body could be used or ab-used. 
When disciplined, it served the State in war and labor. 
When undisciplined, it was valueless to the State. 
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Hence . . . if a thing is to be useful, it must 
be not only of an availing nature, but in availing 
hands.... 
Wealth, therefore, is "THE POSSESSION OF THE VAL­
UABLE BY THE VALIANT. . . The value of the thing, 
and the valour of its possessor must be estimated 
together. (XVII, 87-88) 
Just as he looks through a painting to see how 
well it represents nature or experience, so Ruskin looks 
through the vocabulary of the political economists to see 
how their terms reflect experience. Needless to say, he 
finds that vocabulary wanting. It is like the artistic 
conventions which obscure the real truths of existence 
from artists and viewers alike. In a sense, such a vocabu­
lary is an unsympathetic fallacy by which the political 
economists cast their own preconceived notions upon the 
social structure and see what they want to see. Certainly 
their theories serve the limited purpose for which they 
are devised, but so does any artistic convention and tech­
nique. The problem in both cases is that without reference 
to fact of experience in the broad sense, their validity 
becomes inapplicable with time. 
But, the vocabulary of the economists is not im­
portant to Ruskin as such. In examining the meaning of 
"value" and "wealth," Ruskin looks through the words to 
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the things they are supposed to represent. He objects 
to the narrowing of the original meaning of wealth by con­
fining it to material objects measured only by money. 
John A. Hobson says, "He is not ultimately concerned with 
the perversion of a word, but with the perversion of an 
idea." Ruskin objects to the taking of material objects 
as a separate study and announcing that it describes "an 
art of national and individual conduct."^® In his art 
criticism he objects to the definition of art in technical 
terms on the same grounds. 
As value and wealth depend upon people for their 
true meaning, so does the term, "price." A fair determina­
tion of price, however, is based upon the amount of labor 
expended upon a product, rather than upon what others think 
the product is worth. Much labor for a small thing is 
not "cheapness of labor," but rather "dearness of the ob­
ject wrought for" (XVII, 96). 
As value, wealth, and price are dependent upon 
human factors, then these terms do not really apply to 
the amount of property one has; for mines and mills are 
worthless unless there are men to work them. Wealth lies 
^^Hobson, p. 75. 
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in the power one has over men, rather than in the amount 
of property one has (XVII, 46). Therefore, it's very 
possible that the men, and not the property or money, are 
the wealth. If so, then 
the final outcome and consummation of all wealth is 
in the producing as many as possible full-breathed, 
bright-eyed, and happy human creatures. 
Yet, most people do not see men as wealth at all, or if 
they do, then they believe that they must be kept in a 
low condition (XVII, 55-56). 
Ruskin concludes that the real test of production 
is how many people can live decent lives on what's pro­
duced: 
Production does not consist in things laboriously made, 
but in things serviceably consumable; and the question 
for the nation is not how much labour it employs, but 
how much life it produces. For as consumption is the 
end and aim of production, so life is the end and aim 
of consiimption. (XVII, 104) 
In short, "There Is No Wealth But Life." This statement 
summarizes Ruskin's idea of the true function of an econom­
ic system, the way it would work if man did not produce 
such artificialities as political economy. A true economy 
simply operates according to natural principles and is 
grounded in truth. But, the existing "science" of political 
economy, based on self-interest, obscures this truth 
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(XVII, 105). In insisting that wealth consists only of 
things contributing to "wholesome human wants" and not 
in serving base or injurious purposes, Ruskin is basing 
true political economy, according to Hobson, on "eternal 
and immutable principles of health and disease, justice 
and injustice." He is piercing through the "is" of the 
political economists to the true "is" which the political 
economists only consider the "ought." He refers to the 
broader range of human economic affairs rather than the 
narrow material concerns of the political economists 
IV. COOPERATION 
The only way for society to produce "healthy, 
happy human beings" is through cooperation, rather than 
competition, of its members. The seeds for this idea 
appeared as early as Modern Painters II in the chapters 
on "vital beauty" in which Ruskin relates the decaying 
effect of impure matter upon healthy matter. His ideal 
state is an analogy of nature in which a state is healthy 
only in proportion to the health and welfare of each 
^^Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
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member.Xn Modern Painters V he defines composition 
as each element in a picture contributing to the picture's 
total effect by balancing imperfections in each other, 
or "helping" each other.He also repeats this idea in 
social and educational terms in A Joy Forever when he says. 
Every so named soul of man claims from every other 
such soul protection and education in childhood--help 
or punishment in middle life--reward or relief, if 
needed, in old age.^^ 
Just as an individual must be able to control his 
property and money before it can be thought of as wealth, 
so control in a nation has a positive connotation. The 
flow of wealth in a country is like the flow of its 
streams. As such it can be directed and distributed by 
human laws just as streams are dammed and controlled by 
humans for beneficial purposes. To propose no control 
as those do who propose the "law of supply and demand," 
is to propose disaster and misery (XVII, 60-61): 
. . . the notion of Discipline and Interference lies 
at the very root of all human progress or power; that 
l^Francis G. Townsend, Ruskin and the Landscape 
Feeling: a Critical Analysis of His Thought during the 
Crucial Years of His Life, 1843-1856 (Urbana, 1951), p. 23. 
l^Rosenberg, p. 42. 
l^uoted in Leon, pp. 266-267. 
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the "let-alone" principle is . . . death; that it is 
ruin to [man] ; . . if he lets his land alone--if he 
lets his fellow-men alone--if he lets his own soul 
alone. (XVI, 26) 
Secrecy, competition, and enmity in mercantile 
dealings are destructive because each person only increases 
the difficulty of the other. Commerce should occur in a 
spirit of openness, cooperation, and good-will. In unity 
of effort men produce the greatest and best results. But 
in divided effort, men frustrate the efforts of each other, 
and each being on his own, cannot do as much as he could 
with help from others (XVI, 95-96). Here Ruskin is calling 
for the narrower "self" to give in to the broader "self" 
to be dominated by Justice and Honesty as purifying ele­
ments. When the narrower self does sacrifice itself for 
the broader self, then the latter grows "as we identify 
our good with that of others."^^ 
This banding together of men to further the life 
elements of a society is an idea which Ruskin got from 
reading Plato's The Republic. Rosenberg points out that 
he uses "justice" in the same sense that Plato did, that 
of man acting in a social, rather than an individual sense. 
^^Hobson, p. 98. 
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Cooperation, not competition, conduces to a just society. 
For Ruskin as for Plato, the state, Rosenberg says, "is a 
moral rather than merely a political or economic organism." 
As Plato saw no virtue without a just state, so Ruskin sees 
no wealth without one.^^ 
Thus, such things as "the profit motive" are ques­
tioned because they further competition and imply unfair 
advantage. Actually, in a just society there can be no 
profit for either party in an exchange situation, because 
articles of equal value have changed hands. But, whenever 
a profit is made by either party, it means that the other 
party has lost something in the transaction. For one to 
profit, he must know something that the other doesn't. 
Because it justifies this kind of activity, political 
economy is a "nescience" rather than a science. Whereas 
other sciences or arts try to do away with their "opposite 
nescience and artlessness," the present science "must . . . 
promulgate and prolong its opposite nescience; otherwise 
the science itself is impossible. It is . . . the science 
of darkness ..." (XVII, 91-92). 
l^Rosenberg, p. 134. 
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In a just society a merchant, because he cooperates 
with others to further life in the community, is honored 
as much as doctors, lawyers, and clergymen are honored. 
But the basic selfishness of the merchants separates them 
from these professions. As these professions serve human­
ity, so should the merchants. Doctors heal, lawyers en­
force justice, and clergymen teach. Merchants should also 
serve by providing food and clothing and essentials of 
life. The people in the other professions are prepared 
to sacrifice themselves to fulfill their duties. So should 
the merchants be prepared to sacrifice their economic life 
to get essentials of life to the people. As they are not 
prepared to sacrifice themselves, but rather exist to serve 
themselves first, they are isolated and not honored in 
society. (XVII, 38-39) 
Not only must merchants be more attentive to 
material needs, but they should also be attentive to the 
moral condition of society. They should produce items 
that would appeal to the good qualities in people rather 
than to their lower desires. Businessmen are not to be 
less ambitious, but more ambitious. With their vast eco­
nomic power, they also carry great moral power, and they 
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should exercise this power, in keeping with the moral 
responsibility that goes with it. With business leading 
the way to morality, there is hope for European art and 
manufacture (XVI, 343-45). 
Cooperation would also solve the unemployment pro­
blem. England's problem is not in finding work for her 
men, but in finding men for her work. Harbors need develop­
ment, and streets need to be built and repaired. Theife 
is a vast amount of work to be done on the nation's farms 
as well: 
The serious question for you is not how many you have 
to feed, but how much you have to do; it is our in­
activity, not our hunger, that ruins us. (XVI, 22-23) 
One way merchants could cooperate would be to re-
institute a guild system in order to eliminate individual 
competition and commercial warfare. Such guilds would 
open the way to "more social and communicative systems" 
(XVI, 97). 
Another way to promote cooperation, would be a 
"paternalistic" government. Ruskin is not calling for an 
institutional change, but a mental change. Up to now 
government has been considered in a merely judicial sense. 
But, there should be a system of "laws, councils, or kings" 
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that would provide for the economic direction of the nation, 
just as a father directs his household (XVI, 25-26). What 
the physical form of the government should be makes little 
difference. The nation must be brought together and headed 
for some positive goal. Pursuit of self-interest does not 
weld a society together. 
As stated before, Ruskin does not desire to redis­
tribute property. His reasoning is to make people consider 
what the true ends of a society are, and once they admit 
that serving themselves first does not lead to fulfilling 
the ends of society, then they will use their money and 
property in the desirable way. He is not a "slave to a 
fixed idea, the owner of a panacea applied indiscriminately 
to cure all evils." Although he passionately denounces 
evil, he never becomes so absorbed with it that it domin­
ates his mind. Industrial dishonesty does not cause a 
bitter class resentment in him, nor does it cause him to 
require structural reforms. Education is the cure. John 
A. Hobson concludes: 
In a word, his social mission was distinctively an 
ethical rather than a political one; and he never lost 
sight of the first requirement of all valid ethical 
teaching, the need "to see life steadily and see it 
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whole."^7 
Greatness in a society, then, is the degree to 
which its members cooperate to answer the needs of life, 
both materially and spiritually. If Ruskin emphasizes 
the material aspects, it is from the same desire to obtain 
a foundation in reality that exists in producing great 
art. He calls for both a vitalizing and idealizing pro­
cess in a nation's economy. Hobson says. 
The reduction of money-cost and money-measured utility 
to the pains of production and the pleasures of con­
sumption, estimated in accordance with the actual de­
sires and feelings of those who produce and consume, 
would be a vitalizing process. 
But, granted that workers are happy and healthy, the ideal­
izing process is important, too: 
Neither order nor progress is possible or conceivable 
without ideals; . . . the welfare of an individual 
or a nation implies a standard of true humanity to 
which the desires and caprices of the moment must 
be referred. 
In calling for cooperation, Ruskin is calling for 
the same submission of ego in members of society as he 
calls for in the artist. The same idea of losing one's 
life to find it applies to both messages. The obstacles, 
l^Hobson, p. 58. 
l^Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
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however, are the same. They are pride and attention to 
artificial theories which obscure the true nature of things. 
They negate the element of man's soul, and they result 
from the kind of mind which lacks penetrative imagination 
and merely plays on the material surfaces of things. Such 
a society not only cannot produce great art, but it also, 
in its neglect of essential life-producing goals, is in 
danger of the very ossification of man that the political 
economists assume in their theories. 
For these reasons, Ruskin sees it fit to conclude 
his final volume of Modern Painters with a statement of 
apparent helplessness in changing the course of English 
society, followed by a warning: 
I do not know what my England desires, or how long 
she will choose to do as she is doing now;--with her 
right hand casting away the souls of men, and with 
her left the gifts of God. (VII, 457) 
So far as you desire to possess, rather than to 
give; so far as you look for power to command, in­
stead of to bless; so far as your own prosperity seems 
to you to issue out of contest or rivalry . . . with 
other men or other nations; so long as the hope before 
you is for supremacy instead of love; and your desire 
is to be greatest, instead of least;—first, instead 
of last;--so long you are serving the Lord of . . . 
Death. (VII, 460) 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF ART 
For either to be vital, art and society must 
function together, society providing for art and art re­
ferring to society. Ruskin states the need for this in­
terrelationship when he says that there are two divisions 
in the economy of nations and households: utility and 
splendor. Neither is to be neglected in favor of the 
other. The pursuit of material things and their accumula­
tion not only neglects beauty and culture, but it also 
develops a mind that sees things only in material terms. 
On the other hand, the pursuit of splendor, pomp, art, and 
rich dress has also been the prelude to national ruin.^ 
There must be a middle ground between a "too laborious 
England" and a "too luxurious Italy." This middle ground 
is "neither oppressed by labor nor wasted in vanity--the 
^The Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook and 
Alexander Wedderburn, Library Edition, 39 vols. (London, 
1903-1912), XVI, 20. Reference to this edition will be 
by volume and page number, and will be included in the 
text. 
Ill 
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condition of a peaceful and thoughtful temperance in aims, 
and acts, and arts" (XVI, 342). 
I. SOCIETY TO PROVIDE FOR ART 
The concentration upon industrialism and commer­
cialism was destroying what Ruskin felt were conditions 
necessary for great art. By ignoring nature and broad 
considerations for mankind, as exenplified in the deeper 
and more important needs of the human soul, the mechanical 
mind was widening the gulf between the practical and ideal. 
Permanent values such as faith, love, and cooperation were 
being undermined by concerns for change in order to "make 
money." Much of Ruskin*s work reveals a desire for these 
permanent values. Advancing industrialism and commercialism 
were destroying the natural scenery of English and European 
landscape, which Ruskin had long felt was a source of gen­
uine artistic expression. Restoration of the European 
cathedrals was replacing the authentic works of the past 
with the kind of imitation without belief which Ruskin 
deplored. He felt these changes personally: 
There are no inns, no human beings any more anywhere; 
nothing but endless galleries of rooms, arid automata 
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in millions, I can't travel, I have taken to stones 
and plants.^ 
Evidence of the soul's participation in rendering 
a viable environment was being replaced by pure intellec­
tual calculations, independent of feeling in the affairs 
of men. The only retreat was to remnants of nature, stones 
and plants, S3mibols of former excellence in architecture, 
sculpture, and painting. Ruskin's conclusion is that given 
the present tendency of development, every acre of England 
and Europe will be either mine-pit or factory site. Under 
these circumstances no beautiful art is possible. English­
men cannot hope to have both art and an England devoid of 
nature (XVI, 338). 
Former works of beauty as a result of nature's 
influence are being neglected. In the midst of factories, 
for example, sits a once-stately Carolingian mansion, now 
abandoned. Its once-fertile garden will not even support 
a weed. An English artist doesn't have much to go on here. 
In contrast, medieval northern Italian artists had for 
their "school of design" towns with colorfully-dressed 
^Quoted in Holbrook Jackson, "Ruskin," Dreamers of 
Dreams; The Rise and Fall of Nineteenth-Century Idealism 
(New York, 1949), p. 132. 
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people and white marble buildings shining under clear sun­
light (XVI, 338-40). Ruskin compares the environmental 
influences upon Turner as a boy in the late eighteenth 
century with those upon Georgione, who grew up in fifteenth-
century Venice. Venice had bright streets, vital architec­
ture, and robust people of strong religious faith as re­
flected in both their public and private lives. Late 
eighteenth-century London, however, provided Turner with 
dark, littered lanes and miserable, hypocritical people, 
Georgione, consequently, delighted in painting city life, 
but Turner fled the city to paint country scenes after 
he first experienced the freshness and purity of nature 
for the first time (VII, 387). 
For the English to be able to produce artists of 
the excellence of Turner and the Venetians, they must 
develop some kind of vision of the ultimate condition their 
city and country are to attain. With such a vision, they 
can order the growth of city and nation so that conditions 
for great art become possible. But, as they are going now, 
with only material wealth as their goal, there will be 
no sense of plan in England's industrial development. It 
may be that the English are satisfied with the prospect of 
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all flatlands being iron, coal, clay and lime pits and 
the mountains serving as quarries, for this is the direc­
tion in which they are heading (XVI, 337-38). 
The kind of thinking nourished in an industrial 
society indicates a more fundamental separation between 
people than merely in how much money they are able to ac­
cumulate: 
The persons who become rich are . . . industrious, 
resolute, proud, covetous, prompt, methodical, sensible, 
unimaginative, insensitive, and ignorant. The persons 
who remain poor are the entirely foolish, the entirely 
wise, the idle, the reckless, the humble, the thought­
ful, the dull, the imaginative, the sensitive, the 
well-informed, the improvident, the irregularly and 
impulsively wicked, the clumsy knave, the open theif, 
and the entirely merciful, just, and godly person. 
(XVII, 90) 
As the more powerful people lack the qualities of 
soul that Ruskin deems essential in both art and society, 
they tend to ignore the engendering or nourishment of these 
qualities in their educational systems. Education is di­
rected only toward developing intellectual qualities, with 
the result that things like drawing are considered inferior 
to writing. Further, anyone possessing visual and manual 
abilities are neglected in school curriculums. Consequently, 
they become "runaways and bad scholars." These people see 
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truly "while your well-behaved and amiable scholars are 
disciplined into blindness and palsy of half their facul­
ties" (V, 376-77). The division, then, extends from 
society, through the educational system, down into the 
individual. Unification of mind and heart becomes impossi­
ble. 
The nature of work to which men are put in the 
factories also discourages artistic invention. Repetitious 
work goes against human nature, because it discounts the 
deeper abilities of men in terms of their putting their 
souls into their work. Work that is meaningless to a man 
cannot engage his heart. Artists and craftsmen should not 
be employed to draw, carve, or make identical articles. 
As men are individuals, they produce different results. 
Allowing individual expression will result in their be­
coming more interested in what they are doing. Conse­
quently, they will do better work, and more of it (XVI, 
37). William Morris, in a preface to The Nature of Gothic, 
which he published separately in 1892, summarizes Ruskin's 
unique contribution in this regard: 
. . . the lesson which Ruskin here teaches us, is that 
art is the expression of man's pleasure in labor; that 
it is possible for man to rejoice in his work, for. 
117 
strange as it may seem to us to-day, there have been 
times when he did rejoice in it, and lastly, that un­
less man's work once again becomes a pleasure to him, 
the token of which change will be that beauty is once 
again a natural and necessary accompaniment of produc­
tive labour, all but the worthless must toil in pain, 
and therefore live in pain. 
In short, a society which recognizes only one half 
of human nature cannot produce the kind of art in which 
the influence of the human soul can be seen. Great art 
grows out of a great society, and a society which does 
not recognize the total nature of man and his deep needs 
is not great: 
Without observation and experience, no design--
without peace and pleasureableness in occupation, no 
design--and all the lecturings, and teachings, and 
prizes, and principles of art, in the world, are of 
no use, so long as you don't surround your men with 
happy influences and beautiful things. . . . Inform 
their minds, refine their habits, and you form and 
refine their designs; but keep them illiterate, un­
comfortable, and in the midst of unbeautiful things, 
and whatever they do will still be spurious, vulgar, 
and valueless. (XVI, 341) 
II. ART TO REFER TO SOCIETY 
In its turn, art, to be meaningful to a society which 
provides the conditions to produce it, must reciprocate 
3 Quoted in Derrick Leon, Ruskin; The Great Victorian 
(London, 1949), p. 178. 
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and refer to the people, their nation, and their god. 
True beauty results when this fusion of art and society-
is achieved. By depicting what's important in a society, 
art serves as a unifying influence: 
There never was, nor can be, any essential beauty 
possessed by a work of art, which is not based on 
the conception of its honored permanence, and local 
influence, as a part of appointed and precious furni­
ture, either in the cathedral, the house, or . . . 
thoroughfare. . . . (XVI, 10) 
That art should have a place in the everyday lives 
of people seems to be a strange notion. Ordinarily one 
thinks of great art as something aloof from everyday life, 
something kept in massive galleries and jealously guarded. 
But, Ruskin believes that great art should be available 
to as many people as possible. He prefers private galleries 
to large public ones, because those who own the works will 
take better care of them than some incompetent, job-seeking 
curator. He feels that when the public sees these works 
in a domestic setting, the art will seem imich more meaning­
ful and not so strange (XVI, 80-81). 
Great art is most effective when it is decorative, 
for then it becomes involved most closely with humanity. 
Ruskin chides art students for thinking that decorative 
119 
art is ignoble. This view of art is too restrictive, the 
result of not placing art's function in its true perspec­
tive: 
The best sculpture yet produced has been the decoration 
of a temple front--the best painting, the decoration 
of a room. 
Because decorative art combines various pieces of art for 
a total effect, it is really noble: "'Portable* art--
independent of all place--is . . . ignoble art" (XVI, 
319-20) . 
By separating architecture and sculpture, English 
architects have dimished the power of both: sculpture's 
because it has no room for the story-telling function it 
had when it decorated buildings; architecture's because 
it has been reduced to mere rules of mechanism (XVI, 360). 
There is no essential difference between architecture and 
sculpture. Any architect can draw moldings, and all archi­
tects prefer some molding to no ornamentation. There is 
little difference between drawing moldings and drawing 
the folds of a draped statue (XVI, 358) . The only way that 
architects can really use their imaginations is to become 
sculptors as well as architects in the spirit of the Greek, 
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Phidias, and the Italians--Michael Angelo, Orcagna, Pisano, 
and Giotto (XVI, 360-61). 
The underlying thought in The Two Paths is, as 
Ruskin points out in the preface, the danger of separating 
art from its reference to society and nature. He says 
that he is holding out to the art student the choice "be­
tween two modes of study, which involve ultimately the 
development, or deadening, of every power he possesses." 
The student must recognize 
the hour and the point of life when the way divides 
itself, one leading to the Olive mountains--one to 
the vale of the Salt Sea. . . . Let him pause at the 
parting of The Two Paths. (XVI, 353-54) 
The choice, of course, is whether to work according 
to nature or according to technique and convention. Ruskin 
illustrates the problem by linking these two "modes of 
study" with the kind of thinking productive of them. 
Northern Scotchmen are devoid of art, yet they have noble 
character. The people of India have a great deal of art, 
yet they are savage and cruel. The difference is not the 
absence of art among the Scotch and the presence of it 
in the Indians, but rather the presence of a love of nature 
in the Scotch and the absence of it in the Indians. Indian 
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art is pure design; there is no relation to natural fact 
in it. Ruskin concludes: 
. . . art, followed as such and for its own sake, 
irrespective of the interpretation of nature by it, 
is destructive of whatever is best and noblest in 
humanity. . . . 
Nature, "simply observed," ennobles humanity. Art, con­
nected with nature, becomes "helpful and ennobling, also" 
(XVI, 268). 
Yet, art must be more than simply connected with 
nature in the narrow sense. If society is included in the 
term, nature, then such art is meaningful. Taken by it­
self, the landscape feeling is really valueless because it 
cannot be applied to practice. Art must unite thought 
and action, the ideal and nature. By itself, the land­
scape feeling and the resultant art represent the very 
form of conventionalism that Ruskin sees as ignoble (X, 
376). But, because it does refer to nature, it has the 
redeeming quality of uniting thought and sight in perceiving 
nature truly (V, 363) . The reason the landscape feeling 
is so ineffectual is that modern people do not believe 
that God is in nature. It has always been the element 
of the human mind which brings man to God and the revelation 
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of sacred truths. In the Sermon on the Mount, Christ 
directed men to observe nature in order to perfect their 
minds (V, 378-79). But now, 
. . . all true landscape, whether simple or exalted, 
depends primarily for its interest on connection with 
humanity or with spiritual powers. Banish your heroes 
and nymphs from the classical landscape--its laurel 
shades will move you no more. Show that the dark clefts 
of the most romantic mountain are uninhabited and un-
traversed; it will cease to be romantic. (VII, 255) 
Picturesque art, as it is painted on the continent, 
is nobler than English picturesque because it embodies 
a sense of man's suffering, poverty, and decay. Unlike 
the English, who try, in their tidiness and cleanliness, 
to deny "human calamity," Continental people sense "the 
pathos of character" hidden beneath their old cathedrals 
(VI, 14-15). Turnerian picturesque is superior, too, be­
cause he has a "communion of heart" with his picturesque 
subjects: "the lower picturesque ideal is eminently a 
heartless one." It is heartless because the artist delights 
only in the outward, visual pleasure without sensing the 
effect time has on the people connected with the structure 
being depicted. But, Turner makes his ruined buildings 
and cathedrals symbolic of people's lives. 
By rendering "the heart" of old buildings artists 
give a sense of continuity and stability in a society, 
as well. There is created a healthy attitude among the 
people toward their past. The Tower of Calais church is 
an example of a people who live comfortably with their 
past. Old as it is, the people still use it, because it 
is not strange to them. The English, so sensitive to what 
is fashionable and what is not, remove vestiges of age 
from their midst as soon as they can. Nothing on the 
Continent is "in" or "out" of "fashion" (VI, 12-13). 
Each generation should regard both its past and 
future, and provide for them. It must make its present 
works useful for future generations. At the same time 
it should accept the work handed to it by preceeding genera­
tions; it should not destroy or tear down old works of 
art or structures by thinking that these past works are 
useless. Concern only for the present results not only 
in forgetting those who tried to produce greatness in the 
past, but also in being forgotten by future generations 
who truly cannot use works which grow useless with time 
(XVI, 63). 
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Works of genius should be made of durable materials 
so that they may be seen in all ages. An extreme example 
of genius wasted is Prince Medici's command to Michael 
Angelo to carve a sculpture in snow. Yet, as artists and 
craftsmen are made to work with cheap materials, the English 
are being no different in their foresight than the "unworthy 
prince" (XVI, 39). 
The rendering of truth in one's own time renders 
that truth for all time, and such art is accomplished only 
by great artists who render the heart and not the exterior 
of people. They provide faces and expressions of the pre­
sent, then provide exteriors of the past. Anachronisms 
do not bother them (V, 127-28). Such an artist is Tintoret­
to. His "The Last Judgment" occurs in Venice, and the faces 
of local Venetians are depicted. Emotions become more 
genuinely depicted than those expressed in the more stereo­
typed paintings of the same subject by lesser artists.^ 
A good understanding of Ruskin's concept of the 
sociology of art is seen in his discussion, "Iron in Nature" 
in the fifth lecture of The Two Paths. Implicit in this 
^Van Akin Burd, "Ruskin's Quest for a Theory of 
Imagination," Modern Language Quarterly, XVII (March, 1956), 
71. 
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discussion, also, is his idea of the sort of thinking con­
ducive to a viable society. He says that most people con­
sider rusty iron a spoiler of spring water and a generally 
worthless thing. On the other hand, they consider polished 
knives and razors more useful and desirable. But, iron's 
tendency to rust is a virtue, not a fault, "for in that 
condition it fulfills its most important functions in the 
universe, and most kindly duties to mankind. . . . Iron 
rusted is Living, but when pure or polished. Dead" (XVI, 
376-77). The rust shows that the iron has taken in oxygen, 
the "breath of life." This combination of iron and air 
is not only nobler than polished steel, but more useful: 
". . . the main service of this metal ... is not in making 
knives, . . . but in making the ground we feed from ..." 
(XVI, 377). 
Iron in the ground is universal, too. It gives 
the earth its brown color. Otherwise the earth would be 
a "dirty white ... in all places, and at all times." 
Not only does it color the earth, but it also colors the 
bricks from which the English build their comfortable, 
warm-looking cottages (XVI, 379-80). 
126 
Iron oxide spans continents, time, and economic 
classes. It colors flint and marble and many jewels of 
the rich. But, the poor can admire the purpleness of hills 
seen at a distance. Iron oxide formed the purple in por­
phyry, so much admired by the Greeks and Romans. It "gives 
flush to all the rosy granite of Egypt . . . and to the 
rosiest summits of the Alps . . . (XVI, 381-84). 
No other passage in Ruskin's works in the years 
1856-1860 seems to symbolize so well the body of his 
thought at this time. His idea of the nobility of rusty 
iron shows how far away popular thought has drifted from 
considerations of natural fact. As a S3nnbol of society 
and industrialism, iron is an index of how artificial and 
technical men have become: they fail to see or value the 
life-giving nature of iron just as they fail to consider 
the life-giving ends society and industry should have. 
Society, as it exists, is iron polished. 
But, just as iron must unite with oxygen to be 
of service in nature, so must art, to be of service to 
man, unite body and soul. But, amateur artists and workmen 
try to work with their hands alone, improving their tech­
nique. All this is useless because "without mingling of 
heart-passion with hand-power, no fine art is possible" 
(XVI, 385). 
If iron represents society, and if oxygen repre­
sents art, the union of these two major elements to pro­
duce life is also easily understood. Ruskin's iron 
"parable" seems to operate on three levels: the need 
in the individual for the unification of fact and ideal 
to produce great art, the need for society to see value 
in human lives, and the need for society and art to fuse 
for the creation of true vitality, both material and 
spiritual, and wholeness. 
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